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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation studies the e¤ect of globalization, specically increased inter-
national trade and nancial integration, on various aspects of the international business
cycle. This dissertation is composed of three essays entitled: "Globalization and Interna-
tional Business Cycle Co-movement", "Globalization and the Phillips Curve", and "Variable
Markups and International Business Cycle Co-movement".
In chapter II, "Globalization and International Business Cycle Co-movement", I
study the causal relationships between bilateral trade integration, bilateral nancial inte-
gration, industrial specialization, and business cycle co-movement. I begin by measuring
the sign and magnitude of these causal channels using a reduced form empirical approach.
In accordance with existing empirical studies, I nd increased trade has a positive e¤ect
on nancial integration and nance has a positive e¤ect on trade, trade has a negative ef-
fect on specialization and specialization has a negative e¤ect on trade, nancial integration
has a positive e¤ect on specialization and specialization has a positive e¤ect on nance,
while trade has a positive e¤ect on co-movement but nance and specialization each have
a negative e¤ect on co-movement.
I then construct a multi-sector, multi-country real business cycle model that can
potentially replicate each of the causal channels that we observe in the data. The goal here
is to nd which of the causal channels that we observe in the data can be explained by
the real business cycle model and its classical assumptions. I nd the model can replicate
the positive causal channel from bilateral nancial integration to industrial specialization,
the positive e¤ect of industrial specialization on nancial integration, the positive e¤ect
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of trade on cyclical co-movement, and the negative e¤ects of nance and specialization on
co-movement.
However this model cannot replicate the negative causal channels between trade
integration and industrial specialization, or the positive channels between trade and nancial
integration.
The model based on classical assumptions predicts that trade has a positive e¤ect
on specialization and specialization has a positive e¤ect on trade. The fact that these
causal channels are positive in the classical model but negative in the data, has been noted
in previous empirical studies and reects the importance of intra-industry trade.
Also, in contrast with the empirical results, the model predicts that trade has a
negative e¤ect on nancial integration and nance has no e¤ect on trade. The negative
e¤ect of trade on nance has been found before in models based on classical assumptions.
Movements in the terms of trade provide consumption risk sharing in the face of country
specic production uctuations and thus make risk sharing through international nancial
markets unnecessary. Some recent theoretical work argues that the positive e¤ect of trade
on nance in the data may be due to cross-country heterogeneity in nancial development.
The classical model has no role for cross-country heterogeneity in nancial development, so
a model based on classical assumptions shouldnt replicate the positive e¤ect of trade on
nancial integration.
The model also predicts that bilateral nancial integration should have no e¤ect on
bilateral trade integration. In the classical model, cross-country di¤erences in the marginal
cost of production are the main determinates of international trade ows. Some recent
work argues that the positive e¤ect of nance on trade in the data is due to cross-country
nancial frictions. According to the WTO, over 90% of world trade ows depend on some
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sort of external nancing (usually trade credits). Greater bilateral nancial integration may
aid this external nancing and thus lead to greater bilateral trade integration.
Chapter III, "Globalization and the Phillips Curve", deals with an issue that is
very relevant to central bankers concerned with the e¤ects of globalization on the conduct
of monetary policy. I specically study two closely related questions. First, will increased
international trade integration make domestic ination less responsive to movements in the
domestic output gap (the attening of the Phillips curve)? Secondly, will this increased
trade integration make domestic ination more responsive to movements in the foreign
output gap?
If the answer to both of these questions is yes, then globalization will lead to the
central bank losing control over the domestic ination rate. This issue has created a bit of
a stir in the profession with two working papers, one from the Fed Board of Governors and
one from the Bank for International Settlements. These papers use di¤erent econometric
techniques and reach opposite conclusions.
Both of these empirical studies su¤er from two problems. First, no empircal study
can truly separate out the e¤ect of increased trade integration from other coincidental
factors like improved central bank credibility that may a¤ect the trade-o¤ between ination
and the output gap. The second problem plaguing both of these empirical studies is a
lack of data availability. Both studies are limited to 20  30 years of quarterly production
and ination data. After controlling for factors like import price ination and including
the necessary lags to control for serial correlation, they are left with very few degrees of
freedom.
To correct for both of these potential problems, I answer the two questions listed
above using a sticky price DSGE model. A model allows me to change only the degree of
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trade integration while holding everything else, like the central bank decision rule, constant.
The model is used as a data generating process to generate time series observations of
production and ination that can be used in the same regressions that appear in previous
empirical studies. Since a model is used as a data generating process, data availability is
not an issue.
With this model, I nd that with increased trade integration there is a slight
reduction in the sensitivity of ination to movements in the domestic output gap and a slight
increase in the sensitivity of ination to movements in the foreign output gap. However I nd
that the e¤ect of the trade integration of the last 30 years on the slope of the Phillips curve
is negligible. Furthermore, using Monte Carlo methods, it is demonstrated that limited
data availability can potentially lead to a wide range of possible answers to the question
of how should globalization a¤ect the slope of the Phillips curve. Specically, the model
shows that even after controlling for import price ination, domestic ination is somewhat
sensitive to movements in the foreign output gap, but Monte Carlo methods show that this
e¤ect is labeled insignicant in a study involving only 20  30 years of data.
In chapter IV, "Variable Markups and International Business Cycle Co-movement",
I introduce endogenous markup variability into a real business cycle model to study the
e¤ects of cyclical changes in a rms desired markup on the co-movement of aggregate
production across countries.
In this model, a rms desired markup is an increasing function of its market
share. In this multi-country model, country specic productivity shocks lead to cyclical
changes in the import share, and thus cyclical changes in both domestic and export rms
market shares. So country specic productivity shocks lead to cyclical changes in the desired
markups of both domestic and export rms.
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This markup variability leads to greater international business cycle correlation.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose there is a positive shock to foreign productivity. Then
foreign marginal costs fall. The relative price of foreign products decreases. Foreign produc-
ers will increase production and domestic producers will cut production. Thus the foreign
shock leads to business cycle divergence.
Foreign producers gain market share at the expense of domestic producers, and
thus foreign markups increase while domestic markups fall. These changes in markups cause
the relative price of foreign goods to increase. Thus markup variability causes a change in
relative prices that is exactly opposite to the change due to the initial productivity shock.
Home and foreign business cycles will diverge less than they would have without variable
markups.
Thus markup variability has a qualitative e¤ect on business cycle correlation. In
this chapter, I quantify that e¤ect and show that markup variability has a signicant e¤ect
on cyclical correlation. Furthermore I show that a real business cycle model with endogenous
markup variability can reproduce the positive e¤ect of trade on co-movement that is di¢ cult
to reproduce in an international real business cycle model with complete international asset
markets.
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CHAPTER II
GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE CO-MOVEMENT
Introduction
The era of globalization has seen a rapid increase in the degree of international
trade and nancial integration. As countries trade more goods and nancial assets, it is
natural to ask what e¤ect will globalization have on the co-movement of business cycles
between countries.
This question is more complicated than simply estimating the e¤ects of bilateral
trade and nancial integration on business cycle correlation. Trade integration a¤ects -
nancial integration, and nancial integration a¤ects trade integration. Similarly, both trade
and nance a¤ect bilateral industrial specialization, which can also a¤ect the co-movement
of business cycles between countries.
The various channels between trade, nance, specialization, and co-movement are
presented in gure 1. In this diagram, a causal channel is represented with an arrow. So for
instance, if we are interested in the e¤ect of greater bilateral trade integration on bilateral
nancial integration, we are interested in the arrow labeled "d". The e¤ect of greater
bilateral trade integration on bilateral business cycle co-movement is represented by the
arrow labeled "a".
Imbs (2004, 2006) estimates most of these channels. He nds a clear positive causal
channel from bilateral trade integration to bilateral nancial integration and vice versa
(channels d and e), a positive channel from nancial integration to industrial specialization
6
Figure 1. The causal channels from trade integration, nancial integration, and industrial
specialization to business cycle co-movement, and the channels between trade, nance, and
specialization
Industrial
Specialization
Business
Cycle
Correlation
Trade
Integration
Financial
Integration
a
b c
d
e
f
g
h
i
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(channel h), and a negative causal channel from bilateral trade integration to industrial
specialization and vice versa (g and f). He also shows that trade and nancial integration
lead to higher business cycle co-movement (a and b), while industrial specialization leads
to less co-movement (c).1
The explanation for many, but not all, of these channels has been the subject of
previous theoretical work.
The channel from trade integration to international business cycle co-movement is
a common feature of the international business cycle literature. Specically, the workhorse
international real business cycle models (IRBC), in Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992,
1994) and Baxter and Crucini (1993) predict that international trade integration actually
lowers international cyclical co-movement. Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmermann (2002) are
able to resolve the discrepancy between the negative e¤ect of trade predicted by the IRBC
model and the positive e¤ect found in the data by changing the nature of trade to include
trade in intermediate goods.
Baxter and Crucini (1995), Arvanitis and Mikkola (1996), and Kehoe and Perri
(2002) nd that bilateral nancial integration should have a negative e¤ect on cyclical
co-movement. Integrated nancial markets mean that capital can move from country to
country chasing the highest marginal return. This leads to swings in investment that can
exacerbate the e¤ects of productivity driven business cycle uctuations.
In addition to these papers that study the e¤ects of exogenous increases in trade
integration, nancial integration, or industrial specialization on business cycle co-movement,
1These empirical ndings are supported by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2004), who nd a complementarity between trade and nancial integration. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and
Yosha (2003) nd a positive causal channel from nancial integration to industrial specialization. Frankel
and Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop (2001), and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) nd evidence that
higher bilateral trade integration leads to higher cyclical co-movement. This is also supported by Calderon,
Chong and Stein (2007), who along with Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (2001) nd evidence that
bilateral industrial specialization has a negative e¤ect on co-movement.
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some papers have endogenized trade, nance, and specialization to model the channels
between these three real variables.
In a model with endogenous industrial specialization, Dornbusch, Fisher, and
Samuelson (1977, 1980) and Krugman (1991) show that trade integration should have a
positive e¤ect on industrial specialization.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) show that under certain circumstances international
trade integration can be a substitute for international nancial integration, while Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (2000) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) nd, under di¤erent assumptions,
an endogenous complementarity between trade and nancial integration.
Similarly, in a model with endogenous nancial integration Heathcote and Perri
(2004) show how nancial integration can arise endogenously between countries that are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks. While not explicitly stated by Heathcote and Perri, this
idiosyncratic country specic risk arises when economic uctuations are at least partially
driven by industry specic shocks and two countries are specialized in di¤erent industries.
This paper uses an IRBC model in the spirit of Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe
(1994) and Kose and Yi (2006) to explain each of the channels in gure 1. In order to
explain each one of these channels, it is necessary to endogenize trade integration, nancial
integration, and industrial specialization.
To provide an empirical benchmark from which to test the models predictions, we
also estimate the various causal channels as in Imbs (2004, 2006).
The second section describes the strategy we use to estimate the channels in gure
1 and the data used in this estimation. We then discuss the results from this estimation
that will serve as an empirical benchmark. The model to explain these empirical results is
described in the third section. The results are presented in the fourth section. Since the
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channels between nancial integration and industrial specialization have not been previously
discussed in the theoretical literature, we will rst use the model to provide the intuition
behind these two channels. Then we present the channels implied by the model and compare
those to the empirical benchmark. Finally the fth section concludes with a summary and
some directions for further research.
Empirics
Variables
Endogenous Variables
In our empirical estimations, the rst variable to consider is a measure of bilateral
business cycle correlation. jh is the correlation of GDP uctuations between countries j
and h. We will use 58 countries in this study, so there are a total of 1653 country pairs
jh. These 58 countries account for 95% of world GDP. The full list of countries can be
found in the appendix. Since GDP is non-stationary, we need to detrend the data before
nding correlations. Our primary detrending method is the Hodrick-Prescott lter, but for
robustness we repeat the estimation using log di¤erences and linear detrending.
The next endogenous variable to consider is the measure of bilateral nancial
integration. Since accurate and complete data on bilateral nancial ows does not exist for
a broad set of countries, we are forced to rely on a proxy for bilateral nancial integration.
To ensure that the results are not due to the particular proxy, we use four alternatives.
The primary measure of nancial integration is introduced in Imbs (2004) and uses
data on external assets and liabilities for a wide range of countries compiled by Lane and
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Milesi-Ferretti (2007). This measure is the di¤erence in relative net foreign asset positions
between countries j and h:
Fjh =
 nfajGDPj   nfahGDPh
 (II.1)
where nfaj denotes the net foreign asset position of country j. If country j is a creditor
country with a large and positive net foreign asset position and country h is a debtor country
with a large and negative net foreign asset position, then it is likely that there are nancial
ows from country j to country h. In this case, Fjh will be large. If on the other hand both
countries are creditor countries and have positive net foreign asset positions then it is less
likely that there are nancial ows between the two, and Fjh is small. Similarly, even if one
country is a net creditor and one is a net debtor, but their net foreign asset positions are
relatively small then the nancial ows between the two may be small, and Fjh is small to
reect this.
The three alternative measures of nancial integration are based on data from the
IMFs Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), the mean absolute deviation of
cross-country di¤erences in debt and equity returns, and a measure based on risk sharing.
Details about each one of these alternative measures can be found in the appendix.
For data on bilateral trade ows we use the Trade, Production, and Protection
database compiled by the World Bank and described in Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). This
data set contains bilateral trade data, disaggregated into 28 manufacturing sectors corre-
sponding to the 3 digit ISIC level of aggregation. It also contains country level production
and tari¤ data with a similar level of disaggregation. The data set potentially covers 100
countries over the period 1976 2004, but data availability is a problem for some countries,
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especially during the rst half of the sample period. To maximize the number of countries
in our sample, we use data for 58 countries from 1991  2004.
Our primary measure of bilateral trade intensity is developed by Deardor¤ (1998)
and used by Clark and van Wincoop (2001), among others. This measure is independent
of the sizes of countries j and h. If the set N contains the 28 industries in the Trade,
Production, and Protection data base, then our primary measure of trade intensity is given
by:
Tjh =
1
2
P
i2N

Xijh +M
i
jh

GDPw
GDPjGDPh
(II.2)
where Xijh represents the exports in sector i from country j to country h, M
i
jh represents
imports in sector i to country j from country h, and GDPw is world GDP .
For robustness we also use an alternate measure of trade integration, details on
this alternate measure are found in the appendix.
With the sectoral value added data in the Trade, Production, and Protection data-
base, we can construct a measure of bilateral industrial specialization. This measure,used
by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Imbs (2004, 2006), is dened as follows:
Sjh =
P
i2N
 V AijGDPj   V A
i
h
GDPh
 (II.3)
where V Aij represents value-added in sector i in country j.
The basic summary statistics and unconditional correlations for our four endoge-
nous variables across all 1653 country pairs are reported in table 1.
Exogenous Variables
The vector XFjh contains the exogenous variables that describe bilateral nancial
integration. This vector contains six elements. The rst three are suggested by Portes and
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Table 1. Summary statistics and unconditional correlations for the measures of cyclical
correlation, nancial integration, trade integration, and industrial specialization
Summary Statistics:
Mean Min Max St. Dev.
 0:134  0:945 0:978 0:011
F 0:434 0:00028 2:038 0:009
T 0:558 0:00003 81:396 0:069
S 0:157 0:036 0:421 0:002
Unconditional Correlations:
 F T S
 1
F  0:084 1
T 0:121 0:044 1
S  0:078 0:340 0:073 1
Rey (2005). They nd that the gravity variables that are commonly used to describe bilat-
eral trade integration are also useful in explaining bilateral nancial integration. Therefore
the rst three elements of XFjh are the physical distance between the capital of j and the
capital of h, a dummy variable equal to one if countries j and h share the same language,
and a dummy variable equal to one if the two countries share a border. The next three
elements of XFjh are from the law and nance literature, and are indices that describe the
rule of law in a country, the strength of creditor rights, and the strength of shareholder
rights. These indices were developed by La Porta et al. (1998), and this original paper
supplies the data for most of the countries in this study. However we also refer to Pistor,
Raiser, and Gelfer (2000) for similar indices for the Eastern European Transition Economies
and Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005) for China. The actual index element in XFjh is simply the
sum of the index value in countries j and h.
The vector XTjh contains exogenous variables that describe bilateral trade inte-
gration. This vector contains six variables, all from the gravity literature. The rst ve
elements in XTjh are the physical distance between the capital of j and the capital of h,
a dummy variable equal to one if countries j and h share the same language, a dummy
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variable equal to one if countries j and h share a border, the number of countries in the
pair that are islands, and the number of countries in the pair that are landlocked. The
sixth element in XTjh is a sum of tari¤ rates in countries j and h. The Trade, Production,
and Protection data set contains information on country and sector specic tari¤ rates. tij
is the average tari¤ applied to imports from sector i into country j. The sixth element of
XTjh is simply the sum of these tari¤ rates across countries j and h and across sectors in N ,
tjh =
P
i2N

tij + t
i
h

.
The vectorXSjh contains three exogenous variables that describe bilateral industrial
specialization. The rst two of these describe per capita income in countries j and h. Imbs
andWacziarg (2003) show that sectoral diversication is closely related to per capita income.
At low levels of income, countries are specialized, then as income increases they diversify.
They also nd that the relationship between income and diversication is non-monotonic.
At high levels of income, as income increases, countries again specialize. For this reason, in
his list of exogenous variables that inuence specialization, Imbs (2004) includes the sum
of per capita GDP across j and h to account for the fact that as income increases countries
diversify, and he also includes the di¤erence in per capita GDP across j and h to account
for the non-monotonic relationship between income and diversication.
To these two variables we add a measure of comparative advantage. The revealed
comparative advantage of country j for production in sector i is dened by Balasa (1965)
as:
bij =
XijP
iX
i
j
=
X
j
 
XijP
iX
i
j
!
(II.4)
where Xij are aggregate exports by country j in sector i. Our third term in X
S
jh is then
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dened as follows:
bjh =
P
i2N
bij   bih (II.5)
Regression Model
To estimate the e¤ects of trade and nancial integration on international business
cycle correlation we use a simultaneous equations model similar to the one introduced in
Imbs (2004). In this model, trade integration, nancial integration, industrial specialization,
and business cycle correlation are all determined endogenously. Thus our simultaneous
equations model will consist of four equations:
jh = + bFjh + aTjh + cSjh + "jh (II.6)
Fjh =  + dTjh + iSjh + X
F
jh + vjh
Tjh =  + eFjh + fSjh + X
T
jh + jh
Sjh =  + hFjh + gTjh + X
S
jh + jh
The nine channels labeled a  i in gure 1 each correspond to specic coe¢ cients
in this system of equations.
Regression Results
The estimation results from the system of equations in (II.6) are reported in table
2. The table reports the results from both an estimation using OLS and an estimation using
multiple equation GMM.
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Table 2. OLS and GMM estimation for the channels between trade, nance, specialization,
and output co-movement, using the notation from gure 1.
OLS GMM
Channel Coe¢ cient SE Coe¢ cient SE
a T to  0:075 (0:008) 0:116 (0:015)
b F to   0:028 (0:010)  0:175 (0:054)
c S to   0:131 (0:026)  0:258 (0:152)
d T to F 0:153 (0:036) 0:595 (0:107)
e F to T 0:100 (0:023) 0:858 (0:147)
f S to T 0:828 (0:065)  2:735 (0:359)
g T to S 0:066 (0:009)  0:063 (0:012)
h F to S 0:074 (0:010) 0:218 (0:038)
i S to F 0:467 (0:079) 2:809 (0:384)
Notes: F , T , and S are the logarithm of the variables that appear
in the text. Intercepts and other control variables are not reported.
The control variables for endogenous variable x are reported as
Xx in the text, where x = F; T; or S. In the GMM estimation the
control variables for x when x is a dependent variable served as
the instruments for x when x is an independent variable.
Turning rst to the channels between bilateral trade and bilateral nancial inte-
gration (channels d and e), we see that trade has a positive e¤ect on nancial integration
and nance has a positive e¤ect on trade. This conrms the complementarity between trade
and nancial integration found in previous empirical studies.
The channels between bilateral trade integration and bilateral industrial special-
ization (channels f and g) show that trade has a negative e¤ect on specialization and vice
versa. This nding, which seems to contradict the ndings of many trade models, has been
found in previous empirical studies and reects the importance of intra-industry trade.
The channels between bilateral nancial integration and bilateral industrial spe-
cialization (channels h and i) show that nancial integration has a positive e¤ect on spe-
cialization and vice versa. This conrms the ndings of previous empirical works that have
shown a positive causal channel from nancial integration to industrial specialization and
it conrms the predictions of previous theoretical papers that predict nancial integration
should arise endogenously between countries that are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
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The channels from trade, nance, and specialization to bilateral business cycle
co-movement (channels a, b, and c) shows that trade leads to business cycle convergence
while nance and specialization both lead to business cycle divergence. This conrms the
ndings of many previous empirical and theoretical studies.
The model
The model in this paper is a multi-sector international real business cycle model.
As in Kose and Yi (2006) there are three countries, two small countries (country 1 and
country 2) and the rest of the world (w). These three countries trade both nal goods
and intermediate inputs. Production in each country is in two sectors: non-durable man-
ufacturing and durable manufacturing. Country 1 is given an absolute advantage in the
non-durable manufacturing sector and country 2 has an absolute advantage in the durable
sector.2 Production is a function of labor, which is mobile across sectors but not countries,
physical capital, which is not mobile across sectors or countries, and traded intermediate
inputs. In this model, economic uctuations are driven by exogenous productivity shocks.
There is one representative household and two representative rms (one in the durable sec-
tor and one in the non-durable sector) in each country. The household consumes nal goods
and supplies labor to domestic rms. Household income is a function of wage income and
dividend payments from both domestic and foreign rms. Firms own capital, and they use
nal goods to invest in new capital. The rm pays a dividend to shareholders that is equal
to its operating income (revenue minus the wage bill and the cost of intermediate inputs)
2We label to sectors durable and non-durable merely for convenience. The two small countries are
symmetric except for the fact that one county has an absolute advantage in one sector and one has an
absolute advantage in the other sector. The two sectors are identical and the degrees of the absolute
advantages are identical. Thus the real variables like aggregate consumption, aggregate labor, and aggregate
capital stock are equal across the two countries in the steady state.
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minus capital expenditures.
We begin with a description of the households problem, preferences, and budget
constraints. Then we will describe the objectives and production technologies of each rm.
Then nally we will discuss the process driving the exogenous productivity shocks and some
key parameters in the model.
Households
The one representative household per country derives utility from consumption
and leisure. The household in country j, with j = 1; 2; w, maximizes expected lifetime
utility:
E0
1P
t=o
t

1
1   (Cjt)
1     
h
h + 1
(Njt)
h+1
h

(II.7)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and h is the labor supply elasticity.
Cjt represents consumption of nal goods, and Njt represents the labor supplied by the
household in country j at time t. Households can only supply labor to domestic rms, so
the total labor supplied, Njt, equals the sum of labor demanded by rms in the nondurable
and durable sectors (n and d) for both the production of intermediate inputs and the
production of nal goods,
P
i2n;d

Nxijt +N
yi
jt

. The superscript x denotes that the labor is
an input into the production of intermediate goods and the superscript y denotes that the
labor is an input into the production of nal goods.
In period 0, the representative rms in the durable and nondurable sectors are
held entirely by the domestic household. In period 0 the representative domestic household
can sell shares of these rms to households in the other two countries and buy shares of
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foreign rms. For the household in country j in period 0 the value of the domestic rm in
sector i = n; d is P ij and the value of the foreign rms in sector i is P ih (where h 6= j). The
representative household will then sell shares of the domestic rms and buy shares of the
foreign rms. The period 0 budget constraint for the representative household in country j
is:
Cj;0 +
P
i2n;d
ijjP ij +
P
i2n;d
ihjP ih +
P
i2n;d
iwjP iw = wj;0Nj;0 +
P
i2n;d
 P ij + dij;0 (II.8)
where dijt are dividends paid by the rm in sector i in country j, and 
i
hj is the share of
the rm in sector i in country h that is held by households in country j. The shares of the
rm held in the three countries must sum to unity, so ih1 + 
i
h2 + 
i
hw = 1, for all i and h.
After period 0 the representative household in each country earns labor income
from domestic rms and dividend income from domestic and foreign rms. The budget
constraints for the representative households in countries 1 and 2 are:
Cjt = wjtNjt +
P
i2n;d
ijjd
i
jt +
P
i2n;d
(1  )ihjrxjht diht +
P
i2n;d
(1  )iwjrxjwt diwt (II.9)
where cross-border dividend payments are taxed at a rate  . Also notice that since dividends
are in terms of the domestic consumption good, cross border dividends from country h to
country j are adjusted by the real exchange rate rxjht .
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Firms and Technology
Production Technology
Production in each sector and in each country is in two stages. There is the
intermediate goods production stage and the nal goods production stage. The intermediate
goods production stage is the simplest, since it is just a function of internationally immobile
capital and labor. Nxijt and K
xi
jt are the labor and capital devoted to the production of
intermediate goods in sector i = n; d and country j = 1; 2 at time t.3 Notice the superscript
x which denotes the use of the inputs in the intermediate goods production stage. This
labor and capital are combined in a Cobb-Douglas production function to produce the
intermediate good from sector i in country j, Xijt.
Xijt = A
i
jt
 
Nxijt
  
Kxijt
1 
(II.10)
Production is augmented by Aijt, which is a productivity parameter specic to sector i in
country j at time t. In this real business cycle model, shocks to A drive business cycle
uctuations. There are more details about the shock process and calibration in a later
section.
Output from the intermediate goods production stage, Xijt, is then distributed
as an intermediate input to both sectors in all three countries, subject to the following
constraint:
3In this description of the production technology, country j is one of the two small countries, not the rest
of the world. Since the small countries and the rest of the world di¤er only in size, the model equations are
nearly identical. The only di¤erence is in the resource constraints in (II.11) and (II.16)
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Xijt =
P
k2n;d

xikj1t + x
ik
j2t + (1  2)xikjwt

(II.11)
where xikjht is an intermediate input supplied by sector i = n; d in country j = 1; 2 that is
used by sector k = n; d in country 1, 2, or w at time t. Since all variables are in per capita
terms, the resource constraint must be altered to account for the relative size of each of the
small countries.  is the size of each of the two small counties, and 1   2 is the size of
the rest of the world. In this constraint, j = 1 or 2, if instead j were the rest of the world,
then the coe¢ cient of Xijt would be 1 2 instead of  . Notice that when the intermediate
goods are written as an output from the rst stage of production, they are written with
capital letters, X. When the intermediate goods are then used as an input they are written
with lower case letters, x. This capital/lower case - output/input convention will be used
throughout this paper.
The intermediate inputs xik1jt; x
ik
2jt; x
ik
wjt are stage 1 outputs from sector i in country
1; 2; or w used as inputs in sector k in country j. Domestic and foreign inputs are imperfect
substitutes, and they are combined in the following CES aggregator:
xikjt =
"
!x1j

xik1jt
x 1
x
+ !x2j

xik2jt
x 1
x
+ !xwj

xikwjt
x 1
x
# x
x 1
(II.12)
where x is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate in-
puts, and !xhj is the weight placed on intermediate goods produced by country h and used
in country j. These ! parameters are set such that the volume of bilateral trade predicted
by the model is the same as in the data.
The intermediate inputs xnkjt and x
dk
jt are both inputs into sector k but are imperfect
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substitutes. They are combined into one intermediate input term by the following CES
function:
xkjt =
"


xkkjt
II 1
II + (1  )

xikjt
II 1
II
# II
II 1
where i 6= k (II.13)
where II is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate inputs into sector k, and 
is the weight placed on inputs from sector k into sector k.
There is also a value added component to the production of nal goods. The
inputs into the value added component are labor and capital, Nykjt and K
yk
jt (notice that
the labor and capital terms are written the same as in equation (II.10), only now they are
written with a superscript y to denote their use in producing nal goods). The technology
that combines the two is the same as in the intermediate production stage.
V Akjt = A
k
jt

Nykjt
 
Kykjt
1 
(II.14)
In production of nal goods the value added component, V Akjt, is combined with
the intermediate inputs component, xkjt, to produce the nal good. This combination is
described by the following CES function:
Y kjt =
"


V Akjt
V I 1
V I + (1  )

xkjt
V I 1
V I
# V I
V I 1
(II.15)
where V I is the elasticity of substitution between value added and intermediate inputs.
This nal good Y kjt is then used domestically or exported. The distribution is
subject to the following constraint:
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Y kjt = y
k
j1t + y
k
j2t + (1  2) ykjwt (II.16)
Notice again that the size parameter  is included in the resource constraint to account for
the size of the two small countries relative to the rest of the world. If instead of representing
the distribution of nal goods from one of the two small counties the equation was meant
to represent the distribution of nal goods from the rest of the world then the coe¢ cient of
Y kjt is 1  2.
Just as before when combining domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, domestic
and foreign nal goods are imperfect substitutes and are combined in the following CES
function:
ykjt =
"
!y1j

yk1jt
y 1
y
+ !y2j

yk2jt
y 1
y
+ !ywj

ykwjt
y 1
y
# y
y 1
(II.17)
for k = n; d, where y is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties of
the nal good, and !yhj is a parameter used to calibrate the volume of trade in nal goods
from country h to country j.
The nal goods from each sector are combined in another CES aggregator function
to form aggregate output in country j:
yjt =
"
1
2
 
ynjt
f 1
f +
1
2

ydjt
f 1
f
# f
f 1
(II.18)
where f is the elasticity of substitution across the nal output from each sector.
This nal output is then used by households for consumption and rms for invest-
ment:
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yjt = Cjt +
P
i2n;d
Iijt (II.19)
where Iijt is investment in physical capital undertaken by the rm in sector i in country j
at time t.
The country and sector specic capital stock evolves according to:
Kijt+1 = (1  )Kijt + 
 
Iijt
Kijt
!
Kijt (II.20)
where  is the one-period depreciation rate of capital, and  (x) that describes the cost of
capital adjustment.4 The capital stock available to sector i in country j at time t,Kijt, equals
the capital demanded for both the production of intermediate inputs and the production of
nal goods, Kxijt +K
yi
jt .
Dividends and the rms problem
The rms objective is to maximize its stock price. The solution to the households
maximization problem in the appendix reveals that the rms stock price, P ijt, is simply the
expected discounted value of future dividends:
P ijt = Et
1X
=1
Qijt+d
i
jt+ (II.21)
where Qijt+ is the price that the rm in sector i and country j uses to value dividend
payments in time t +  relative to consumption at time t.5 The rms dividend (in units
4
0
> 0 and 
00
< 0. The model is solved using a rst-oder approximation, so a specic functional form
for  (x) is not necessary, but the function can be expressed as  (x) =

x  
2
(x  )2 with   0.
5We will assume that the domestic rm discounts future dividends in time t+  by the time discounting
factor  multiplied by a ratio of the domestic marginal utility of consumption in time t+  to the domestic
24
of the nal consumption/investment good), dijt, is equal to its operating income at time t
minus any capital expenditures:
dijt =

P yijt Y
i
jt + P
xi
jt X
i
jt

  wjt

Nyijt +N
xi
jt

(II.22)
  P
k=n;d
pxkjt x
ki
jjt  
P
k=n;d
rxhjt p
xk
ht x
ki
hjt  
P
k=n;d
rxwjt p
xk
wtx
ki
wjt   Iijt
where P yijt and P
xi
jt are the prices of nal output and intermediate goods, respectively. Thus
P yijt Y
i
jt + P
xi
jt X
i
jt is total revenue of the rm in sector i in country j. wjt is the wage rate
paid to workers in country j, so wjt

Nyijt +N
xi
jt

is the rms wage bill.6
P
k=n;d
pxkjt x
ki
jjt
is the expenditure on domestically supplied intermediate inputs from both sectors, andP
k=n;d
rxhjt p
xk
ht x
ki
hjt +
P
k=n;d
rxwjt p
xk
wtx
ki
lwjt is the expenditure on imported intermediate inputs.
Since the price of foreign intermediate inputs, pxkht and p
xk
lt , is in terms of the foreign con-
sumption/investment good, foreign prices must also be multiplied by the real exchange
rates rxhjt and rx
wj
t . Finally, capital expenditure is simply the real cost of physical capital
investment, Iijt.
Since markets are perfectly competitive, the representative rms operating income
can be represented as the capital stock available to the rm at time tmultiplied by the sector
and country specic shadow price of capital, rijt:
dijt = r
i
jtK
i
jt   Iijt (II.23)
marginal utility of consumption in time t, Qijt+ =
MUjt+
MUjt
. This discount rate can be altered to account
for foreign marginal utilities as well, and this may be reasonable when the rm is owned by both domestic
and foreign residents. But including both domestic and foreign marginal utilities in the discount factor
can give rise to a specic type of externality highlighted in Heathcote and Perri (2004). Under certain
circumstances this externality can give rise to multiple equilibria. To insure that the results from the model
are not clouded by the existence of these multiple equilibria, we will assume the rms discount factor is
determined by domestic preferences alone.
6Labor is mobile across sectors (nondurable and durable) and across stages of production (intermediate
and nal goods stages), but is not mobile across countries. Thus the wage rate, wj , is country specic.
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Exogenous Productivity Shocks
In this model the exogenous productivity parameter Aijt serves two purposes. As
in all real business cycle models, changes in Aijt represent technology shocks that shift the
supply curve and drive business cycle uctuations. Also, in this multi-sector, multi-country
model we can also use the steady state value of Aij to give one country an absolute advantage
in a certain sector, and thus induce industrial specialization.
To describe the stochastic movements in Aijt, we rst calculate Solow residuals
in the durable and nondurable sectors in 17 countries using sector level value added, em-
ployment, and capital stock data taken from the OECDs STAN database.7 We use these
34 time series of Solow residuals (2 sectors per country, 17 countries) to estimate 2 sector
specic shocks and 16 country specic shocks using the factor model in Stockman (1988).
Therefore each of our 34 time series of Solow residuals can be decomposed into a
sector specic component, a country specic component, and an idiosyncratic component:
A^ijt = A^
i
t + A^jt + a^
i
jt (II.24)
If we assume that the industry specic shocks are orthogonal to the country specic
shocks then we can separately estimate the process driving the industry specic shocks and
the process driving the country specic shocks. We write the two sector specic shocks as
a vector, Ast =

A^nt A^
d
t
0
, and assume that they follow a VAR(1) process described by:
Ast = 
sAst 1 + "t (II.25)
where 
s = E
 
"t"
0
t

7Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States
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Furthermore since we are using nondurables and durables as names for generic, identical
sectors, we need to make the s and 
s matrices symmetric:
s =
2664 0:3449 0:0344
0:0344 0:3449
3775 and 
s = 10 3
2664 0:3570 0:2414
0:2414 0:3570
3775 (II.26)
Similarly we can write any pair of country specic shocks as a vector, Act =
A^jt A^kt
0
, and assume they follow a VAR(1) process described by:
Act = 
cAct 1 + "t (II.27)
where 
c = E
 
"t"
0
t

If we average the c and 
c matrices across all country pairs, jk, then the stochastic process
describing the country specic shocks is:
c =
2664 0:4280  0:0480
 0:0480 0:4280
3775 and 
c =
2664 0:0025 0:0006
0:0006 0:0025
3775 (II.28)
Finally, if we combine the sector and country specic idiosyncratic shocks for any
pair of countries into a 4x1 vector, ait =

anjt a
d
jt a
n
kt a
d
kt
0
, then we can calculate the
variance matrix of the idiosyncratic shocks for any pair of countries. The variance matrix
when averaged across all country pairs is:
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i = 10 3
266666666664
0:4130  0:4130  0:0262 0:0262
 0:4130 0:4130 0:0262  0:0262
 0:0262 0:0262 0:4130  0:4130
0:0262  0:0262  0:4130 0:4130
377777777775
(II.29)
Other Parameters
All parameter values are listed in table 6. The rst 9 parameters are taken from
existing business cycle literature. In the various simulations in the next section, the period
length is one quarter. The rst two parameters, the discount factor and the depreciation
rate, are commonly found in the literature for periods of one quarter. The elasticity of
substitution across nal goods from di¤erent sectors, f , is taken from Ambler, Cardia, and
Zimmermann (2002). The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods can
be thought of as the import demand elasticity. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) survey
the literature that attempts to measure this elasticity and nd that at the sectoral level
of disaggregation, the import demand elasticity is somewhere between ve and ten. We
assume that this elasticity is equal to ve.
The next three parameters like labor share, , the weight placed on intra-industry
intermediate inputs, , and the share of value added in the production of nal goods, , are
all derived from input-output tables. The parameter that describes the relative size of one
of the two small countries, , is set to equal the relative size of one of the countries in our
empirical estimations.
The investment adjustment cost parameter, , is calibrated such that in the model,
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Table 3. Parameter values for the model in chaper II
Symbol Value Description
 0:99 discount factor
 0:025 capital depreciation rate
 2 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
f 0:9 eos* across nal goods
y 5 eos* between home and foreign nal goods
V I 0:5 eos* between value added and intermediate inputs
II 0:5 eos* between intermediate inputs from various sectors
x 5 eos* between home and foreign intermediate goods
 0:6136 labor share
 0:8615 weight placed on inputs into sector i from sector i
 0:4397 weight placed on value added in production of nal goods
 0:015 relative size of one of the two small countries
 7 investment adjustment cost parameter
!xw 0:5734 weight on imported intermediate inputs from ROW
!yw 0:2373 weight on imported nal goods from ROW
!x 0:0098 weight on imported intermediate inputs from the other small country
!y 0:0041 weight on imported nal goods from the other small country
 0:0044 tax rate on foreign dividends
An1 ; A
d
2 1:0719 absolute advantage of country 1 in sector n and country 2 in sector d
* eos=elasticity of substitution
investment is about 2:75 times more volatile than GDP.
The model is calibrated to match observed steady state levels of trade integration,
nancial integration, and industrial specialization. These observed steady state levels are
referred to as targets. In the calibration of the model we have six targets to hit.
These targets are the average levels of trade integration, nancial integration, and
industrial specialization from the countries in our empirical estimations.
The target variable measuring trade integration is dened in (II.2). This variable
can loosely be dened as the import penetration ratio. Specically, our target measure
of intermediate goods trade integration is 0:321 and our target level of nal goods trade
integration is 0:237. Since the measure of trade integration in (II.2) is independent of
country size, these target values are the same whether we are describing trade between
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the two small countries or one country and the rest of the world.8 Our target measure of
industrial specialization is also taken from the empirical model. In the data, the average
level of industrial specialization, as dened by (II.3), is 0:157. The target for nancial
integration is the percent of a households equity portfolio that is made up of foreign equities.
The model is calibrated such that 10% of the households equity portfolio is made up of
foreign securities..
To hit these targets, we use six parameters, technology parameters describing
preference for imported intermediate and nal goods from the other small country and
the rest of the world, !xjh; !
x
wj ; !
y
jh; !
y
wj , the tax rates on foreign dividends,  , and the
exogenous absolute productivity advantage for country j in sector i, Aij . The benchmark
values of these parameters are listed in table 6.
Results
Intuition for the channels between nance and specialization
First, consider the solution to the households problem presented in the appendix.
We can use the rst order conditions with respect to domestic and foreign asset holdings
to derive an expression for the value of a share of rm i in country j. The same stream
of dividend payments may be valued di¤erently by domestic and foreign investors because
of tax rates, exchange rates, and di¤erences in discount factors. Therefore the value of the
rm to households in country j and country h is, respectively:
8This size independence is the virtue of using the measure of trade integration dened in (II.2) instead
of the measure dened in (A.7).
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P ijj =
P1
t=1 
tE0

jtd
i
jt

j;0
(II.30)
P ijh =
(1  )P1t=1 tE0ht dijtrxt
h;0
where P ijj is the value of rm i in country j to investors in country j and P ijh is the value
of the same rm to foreign investors in country h.
jt is equal to the marginal utility of consumption in country j, (Cjt)
 . Thus if
we apply a second order approximation to the terms E0

jtd
i
jt

and E0

ht
dijt
rxt

the asset
prices can be written as:
P ijj =
dij

1 + 12 ( + 1)E

c^2jt

  E

d^ijtc^jt

(1  ) (II.31)
P ijh =
(1  )dijt

1 + 12 ( + 1)E
 
c^2ht
  E c^htd^ijt
(1  )
where a "hat" over a variable represents a percent deviation from its steady state value.9
Therefore E
 
x^2

is the variance of x and E (x^y^) is the covariance between x and y.
We will stop here with the asset price equations and now turn to the rms in-
vestment decision. Consider the rst order condition of the rms problem with respect to
the capital stock in the next period. For the sake of simplicity, assume that there are no
investment adjustment costs:
Et

Qijt+1
 
1   + rijt+1
	
= Qijt (II.32)
Use the fact that Qijt+ =
jt+
jt
, and then take a second order approximation
9For clarity of explanation we omitted the covariances involving rxt from the second order approximation
of Pijh. They are included in the actual numerical simulations. But they are usually one order of magnitude
smaller than the other covariances, so they can be omitted without jeopardizing any intuitive explanation.
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of the term Et
n
Qijt+1

1   + rijt+1
o
to nd the required rate of return on capital in
sector i in country j:
rij = r
rf
j
1 + 12 ( + 1)E

c^2jt

1 + 12 ( + 1)E

c^2jt

  E

c^jtr^ijt
 (II.33)
where rrfj is the risk free rate of interest, r
rf
j =

1
(1+ 12(+1)E(c^
2
jt))
  1 + 

If we consider the "market portfolio" in country j to have identical uctuations
with consumption in country j, then we can use this last expression to nd a version of the
consumption-CAPM, as in Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979).
rij = r
rf
j + 
i
j

rcj   rrfj

(II.34)
where rcj is the return on the market portfolio, and 
i
j measures the riskiness of capital in
sector i by measuring the covariance between rij and returns to the market portfolio.
For the intuition of how nancial integration leads to industrial specialization and
how industrial specialization leads to nancial integration, consider the households budget
constraint in period t:
Cjt = wjtNjt +
P
i2n;d
ijjd
i
jt +
P
i2n;d
(1  )ihjrxjht diht +
P
i2n;d
(1  )iwjrxjwt diwt
Imagine that the degree of international nancial integration is low; thus house-
holds hold equity portfolios that are strongly biased towards home assets (jj  1 and
hj ; wj  0). Now, imagine that production in each country is at least partially special-
ized, with country j partially specialized in sector n and country h partially specialized
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in sector d: Then a large percentage of household js dividend income, and thus income,
comes from sector n, and a large percentage of household hs income comes from sector d.
If business cycles are at least partially driven by industry specic shocks, countries j and h
have highly idiosyncratic income uctuations.
The combination of home biased portfolios and industrial specialization means
that the covariance of uctuations in dnjt and Cjt is high, and the covariance of uctuations
in dnjt and Cht is low. From the asset price equations in (II.31) we can see that households
in country j will assign a low value to shares in the home rm in sector n, but households
in country h will assign a high value to the same shares, P ijh > P ijj .
In equilibrium, both domestic and foreign households assign the same value to the
rm. Households in country j will sell shares of the domestic rm in sector n to households
in country h, njj # and njh ". This portfolio adjustment will cause the covariance of
uctuations in dnjt and Cjt to fall and the covariance of uctuations in d
n
jt and Cht to
rise. This portfolio adjustment will continue until P ijh = P ijj and there are no gains to
international asset trade.
The tax rate  will lessen and potentially negate these gains from asset trade, but
as long as  is low enough that households hold a portfolio comprised of both home and
foreign assets, and industry specic shocks play some role in business cycle uctuations, then
greater bilateral industrial specialization will lead to greater bilateral nancial integration.
For the intuition of why nancial integration leads to industrial specialization,
again turn to the households budget constraint. Imagine that country j has an absolute
advantage in sector n. This means that country j will be at least partially specialized in
sector n. If households own highly home biased equity portfolios, then household income
in country j is highly dependent on the fortunes of sector n. Thus the covariance between
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uctuations in rnjt and Cjt is high. The required rate of return on investments in sector n
in country j is high, as shown by (II.33). This high required rate of return will lead to less
investment and production in sector n, even though country j has an absolute advantage.
Financial integration will mean that the household does not hold a portfolio as heavily
biased towards home assets, and this will separate idiosyncratic uctuations in sector n
from household income in country j. This will cause the covariance between rnjt and Cjt to
fall, and thus the required rate of return will fall. This will lead to more investment and
production in sector n, and country j will specialize in order to realize the potential benets
of their absolute advantage.
Numerical results from the model
The steady state solution to the model will depend on the variances and covariances
of real variables (e.g., the covariance between consumption and dividend payments). We
nd these variances and covariances through a stochastic approximation, and a stochastic
approximation is only good in the neighborhood of the steady state. Therefore we need to
solve the model using a solution algorithm described in the appendix.
To measure the channels between trade, nance, and specialization, and between
these three real variables and cyclical correlation, we make use of the fact that trade, nance,
specialization, and cyclical correlation are all endogenous in this model.
The channels we wish to measure are labeled a  i in gure 1. However we cannot
simply increase bilateral trade integration and measure the resulting change business cycle
correlation to nd a. As the gure shows, since nancial integration and industrial special-
ization are both endogenous, increasing trade has an e¤ect on nance and specialization
which in turn have their own e¤ects on cyclical correlation. Therefore simply measuring
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the change in cyclical correlation resulting from an exogenous change in trade integration
will capture the direct e¤ect of trade on correlation as well as any indirect e¤ects through
nance and specialization.
These direct and indirect e¤ects and how they relate to the nine channels in gure 1
are listed in table 4. If, for instance, we were to measure the change in nancial integration
resulting from an exogenous increase in trade integration, we would measure both the
direct channel (d) and the indirect channel whereby trade a¤ects specialization which in
turn a¤ects nance (g  h). Our measured change in nancial integration resulting from
an exogenous increase in trade integration is equal to d + g  h. If we engineer exogenous
changes in trade, nance, or specialization and measure the resulting change in the other
two endogenous variables as well as cyclical correlation then table 4 shows how the various
direct channels (a through i) can be found by solving a non-linear system of nine equations
and nine unknowns.
Table 4. The direct and indirect e¤ects of trade, nance, and specialization on business
cycle co-movement, using the notation in gure 1
Channel Direct E¤ect Indirect E¤ect
T to  a d b+ g  c+ d h c+ g  i b
F to  b e a+ h c+ e g  c+ h f  a
S to  c f  a+ i b+ f  d b+ i e a
T to F d g  h
F to T e h f
S to T f i e
T to S g d h
F to S h e g
S to F i f  d
These nine channels are listed in the rst column in table 5. The numerical results
from the model are directly comparable to the estimation results in table 2. Specically,
the table shows the percent change in an endogenous variable arising from an exogenous 1%
increase in another variable. Thus turning to the channel from trade integration to nancial
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integration (channel d), the rst column of table 5 shows that an exogenous 1% increase in
bilateral trade leads to an endogenous fall in bilateral nancial integration of about 0:5%.
Thus the model predicts that trade has a negative e¤ect on nancial integration.
This is consistent with the ndings from Cole and Obstfeld (1991), who show that trade
and nancial integration are substitutes in terms of providing consumption risk sharing.
However Forbes (2008) argues that cross-country di¤erences in nancial development, not
risk sharing, are the main driver of international nancial ows. Similarly, Antràs and
Caballero (2007) argue that the complementarity of trade and nancial integration in the
data is due to trade and nancial ows involving less nancially developed economies. Risk
sharing through portfolio diversication is the primary reason for bilateral nancial integra-
tion in this model, and there are no di¤erences across countries in nancial development, so
consistent with the risk sharing channel from Cole and Obstfeld, we should expect a trade
to have a negative e¤ect on nancial integration.
Table 5. Theoretical predictions of the elasticities of output co-movement, trade integration,
nancial integration, and industrial specialization with respect to changes in trade, nance,
and specialization
Elasticities implied by the model
Channel without 3rd country e¤ect with 3rd country e¤ect
a T to  0:004 0:029
b F to   0:004  0:004
c S to   0:0001  0:008
d T to F  0:580  6:347
e F to T 0:000 0:000
f S to T 0:009 0:009
g T to S 0:020 0:520
h F to S 0:0002 0:0003
i S to F 15:759 3:512
In the data we also see that nance has a positive e¤ect on trade, channel e. The
model predicts that nance has no e¤ect on trade. This is consistent with Manova (2008)
who argues that the empirical nding of a positive e¤ect of nance on trade is due to
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borrowing constraints, since the vast majority of world trade is facilitated with nancial
instruments like trade credits. Since no borrowing constraints are introduced in this model,
we shouldnt expect the model to predict a positive e¤ect of nance on trade.
The channels from bilateral trade to bilateral industrial specialization and vice
versa are indexed f and g. In the data we nd that trade has a negative e¤ect on spe-
cialization and specialization has a negative e¤ect on trade. This is consistent with Imbs
(2004, 2006) who argues that this is due to the importance of intra-industry trade. In the
model, trade and nance have a positive e¤ect on one another. This robust result of trade
theory should be expected in this case where we are not specically increasing the degree
of intra-industry trade integration.
The channels from bilateral nancial integration to bilateral industrial specializa-
tion and vice versa are indexed h and i. In the data we nd that nancial integration
has a positive e¤ect on specialization and specialization has a positive e¤ect on nance.
In the model these two channels are positive as well. This is not surprising since in an
earlier section the model is used to show the intuition behind the channels from nance to
specialization and vice versa.
The channels from bilateral trade integration, nancial integration, and industrial
specialization to output correlation are indexed a c. In the data, trade has a positive e¤ect
on co-movement but specialization and nance each have a negative e¤ect. The positive
e¤ect of trade and the negative e¤ects of nance and specialization hold in the model as
well.
A comparison of the models results in the rst column of table 5 with the em-
pirical results in table 2 shows that the international real business cycle model preforms
reasonably well in qualitatively matching the data. However the model does not come close
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to quantitatively matching the data, and usually the channels as measured by the model are
a few orders of magnitude smaller than the channels as measured from the data. Kose and
Yi (2006) encounter this problem in their three country model as well and conclude that it
is due to empirical overestimation, not underestimation in the model. They conclude that
the empirical results su¤er from omitted variables bias.
The volume of trade between any two countries is usually pretty small, so doubling
trade between any two countries does not lead to a large increase in the volume of trade
between them. Thus a small increase in the volume of bilateral trade probably doesnt have
a great e¤ect on bilateral correlation. When the empirical model measures the e¤ect of
increases in bilateral trade integration on bilateral cyclical correlation, it is not controlling
for trade with the rest of the world. The empirical results are picking up the fact that for
a country pair, an increase in bilateral trade is highly correlated with an increase in total
trade. Thus if the two countries have similar trading partners then a large fraction of the
e¤ect of trade integration on cyclical correlation is due to increased trade through a third
country. This third country e¤ect would be controlled for if a measure of total trade were
included in the earlier empirical model, but because of the di¢ culty in instrumenting for
total trade, all empirical studies omit it from the regression, leading to omitted variables
bias.
To correct for this third country e¤ect, we recalculate the channels implied by the
model, but now we assume that an exogenous increase in trade integration does not just
involve an increase in bilateral trade between countries one and two but and increase in trade
with the rest of the world as well. Similarly, an exogenous increase in nancial integration
involves not only an increase in bilateral cross-border portfolio holdings, but an increase
in cross-border portfolio holdings with the rest of the world. The results from altering the
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model to account for this third country e¤ect are found in the second column of table 5.
Qualitatively the results are identical when we include trade and nancial integration with
the rest of the world. For some channels, accounting for trade and nancial integration with
the rest of the world signicantly improves the quantitative predictions of the model. As
in Kose and Yi (2006) accounting for trade with the rest of the world greatly improves the
models ability to quantitatively predict the e¤ect of trade integration on cyclical correlation
(channel a).
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we endogenize bilateral trade integration, nancial integration, and
industrial specialization in order to nd the causal channels between these three real vari-
ables and their e¤ect on bilateral business cycle correlation. We rst replicated the results
of previous empirical studies, then we built an international real business cycle model that
could (potentially) replicate each one of these channels. Some of these channels have been
modeled before in either the trade or the business cycle literatures, some have not.
The model is able to replicate the e¤ects of trade, nance, and specialization on
business cycle correlation. The model is also able to replicate the positive e¤ect of bilateral
nancial integration on industrial specialization and the positive e¤ect of specialization on
nance, but in a few cases the model failed to reproduce the e¤ects from the data.
Empirical studies show that bilateral trade integration has a negative e¤ect on
bilateral industrial specialization and vice versa. This result, which is contrary to trade
theory, is attributed to the increasing importance of intra-industry trade. In the model,
our exogenous increase in trade integration did not emphasize intra-industry trade, and
thus we found the common result from trade theory. The failure of this model to account
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for the negative e¤ects of trade on specialization and vice versa show that any attempt to
endogenize both trade and industrial specialization needs to account for the role of intra-
industry trade.
Empirical studies also show that bilateral nancial integration has a positive e¤ect
on bilateral trade integration and vice versa. The e¤ect of nance on trade is due to
the fact that the vast majority of world trade relies on trade nance, especially trade
credits. Financing constraints were not built into this real business cycle model, so the
model couldnt replicate the positive e¤ect of nance on trade.
Also, recent studies show that cross-country heterogeneity in nancial development
is the primary driver of cross-border capital ows and can be responsible for the positive
e¤ect of bilateral trade integration on bilateral nancial integration. In this real business
cycle model there is no cross-country heterogeneity in nancial development, so the model
is not able to replicate the positive e¤ect of trade on nance. The failure of this model to
account for the positive e¤ects of trade on nance and vice versa show that any attempt to
endogenize both trade and nancial integration needs to account for the role of nancing
constraints and cross-country di¤erences in nancial development.
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CHAPTER III
GLOBALIZATION AND THE PHILLIPS CURVE
Introduction
When discussing the macroeconomic impacts of globalization, one question that
arises is what e¤ect will globalization have on ination, specically the dynamics of the
ination process? Will globalization reduce a central banks control over domestic ination?
Economists agree that in a country with a oating currency, the central bank has
complete control over the long run rate of ination. However short term frictions may
mean that in the short run ination is not always a monetary phenomenon, and factors like
domestic and foreign excess capacity may have a role in short run uctuations in ination.
The e¤ect of globalization on the short run trade-o¤ between output and ination
has been the subject of recent policy discussion.1 This debate revolves around two related
questions. Will globalization reduce the sensitivity of domestic ination to movements in
the domestic output gap (the attening of the Phillips Curve) and will globalization increase
the sensitivity of domestic ination to movements in the foreign output gap?
In response to the rst question Roberts (2006), The International Monetary Fund
(2006), Ball (2006), and Mishkin (2007) all claim that the impact of the domestic output
gap on domestic ination has declined in recent years. However they disagree as to what
caused this attening of the Phillips Curve. Roberts and Mishkin argue that it is entirely
1See remarks by Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Donald Kohn (2006), Deputy Governor of the
Bank of England Charlie Bean (2006), Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke (2007), Governor
of the Bank of Japan Toshihiko Fukui (2007), and President of the European Central Bank Jean-Claude
Trichet (2008). In addition, this topic was the subject of a recent academic speech by former Fed Governor
Frederic Mishkin (2009).
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due to improved monetary policy. The IMF argues that it is due to increased globalization
and trade integration, however Ball disputes this.
In response to the second question, Tootell (1998) and Ball (2006) argue that the
foreign output gap plays little or no role in determining domestic ination. Gamber and
Huang (2001) argue that the foreign output gap does play a role in determining U.S. ina-
tion, and they argue that excess foreign capacity is responsible for the "missing ination"
of the 1990s. Wynne and Kertsing (2007) extend Tootells study with an extra ten years of
data and nd some evidence that measures of foreign slack play a role in determining U.S.
ination.
The papers that most directly address the two questions listed above are Pain,
Koske and Sollie (2006), Borio and Filardo (2007) and Ihrig, Kamin, Linder, and Marquez
(2007). Borio and Filardo argue that for a range of countries, domestic ination has become
less responsive to movements in the domestic output gap. Pain et al. and Ihrig et al. do
not dispute this, but question whether this "attening of the Phillips curve" has anything
to do with globalization.
As for the role of foreign slack in determining domestic ination, Borio and Filardo
argue that, even after controlling for import price ination, the coe¢ cient on the foreign
output gap in a Phillips curve regression is positive and signicant. They also argue that
this coe¢ cient is increasing over time. Pain et al. and Ihrig et al. directly challenge this
result. They argue that the Borio and Filardo regressions are misspecied, and once certain
corrections are made, the foreign output gap is an insignicant determinate of domestic
ination. Pain et al. nd that domestic ination is sensitive to movements in the foreign
output gap, but this is entirely due to movements in import prices. Thus the foreign output
gap does not contain any new information for ination that is not already captured by
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import price ination.
Woodford (2007) addresses this issue in a theoretical model. Using the open-
economy monetary model of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), he shows that trade integra-
tion will have little e¤ect on domestic output-ination dynamics.
Like Woodford, this paper addresses this question with a theoretical model. This
paper will repeat the tests from the empirical literature, using a DSGE model as the data
generating process. Using the model to generate the data for the empirical estimation allows
us to do two things. First, with the model we can change the degree of trade integration
while keeping everything else xed. This allows us to single out the e¤ect of increased trade
integration on the slope of the Phillips curve. Second, when a model is used as a data
generating process, there are no limits to data availability. This is important since variables
like the foreign output gap may have a small but positive e¤ect on domestic ination but
because of limited data availability leading to high standard errors the e¤ect is labeled
insignicant in empirical studies.
The model used to generate this ination and output data is described in the
second section. The calibration of the model and the exogenous shock process are described
in the third section. The results are presented in the fourth section. To gain an intuitive
understanding of the model and the role of the exogenous shocks, we start with some
impulse responses. Then we consider the Phillips curve regression that is used to measure
the impact of domestic and foreign slack on domestic ination. First we consider how the
trade integration of the past 30 years has a¤ected the Phillips curve, then we consider how
the Phillips curve is a¤ected as we move from complete autarky to free trade. Finally, the
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fth section concludes with a summary and a prescription for policy makers.
Model
The model used in this paper follows the New Open Economy Macro approach
of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) and incorporates many of the variations reviewed by Lane
(2001). In this model there are two types of rms, rms that produce traded goods and rms
that produce non-traded goods. Traded goods rms are engaged in imperfect competition
while non-traded goods rms are engaged in perfect competition. Both types of rms use
country specic capital and labor as inputs.
Households supply a household specic type of labor. This imperfect competition
in the labor market and in the market for traded goods is a necessary condition for wage
and price rigidity. Nominal wages and the nominal prices are xed for a length of time as
in Calvo (1983).
Business cycles are driven by government spending shocks. The government spend-
ing shock can be thought of as a pure demand shock that leads to movements along the
Phillips curve.
Production
There are two countries, home and foreign. The equations describing technology
and preferences are nearly identical, but foreign variables and parameters are written with
a "". The corresponding preference or technology equations for the foreign country are
omitted when the only di¤erence is one of notation. When there is a more substantive
di¤erence, the corresponding equation for the foreign country is presented. Production by
the traded goods rm indexed i is a function of country specic capital and labor:
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Xt (i) = h
x
t (i)
1 Kxt (i)
    (III.1)
where hxt (i) is the labor input into production by traded goods rm i, K
x
t (i) is the capital
input, and  is a xed cost parameter that is calibrated to ensure that rms earn zero prot
in the steady state.
The output of rm i can be sold domestically or exported:
Xt (i) = x
d
t (i) + x
x
t (i) (III.2)
Home country rms are indexed i 2 [0; n], and foreign country rms are indexed i 2 (n; 1],
where the parameter n describes the relative size of the home country and is used later to
evaluate how country size a¤ects the slope of the short run Phillips curve.
There is an iceberg cost to international trade, implying that when one unit of a
good is shipped internationally, only 1  c units arrive. Thus xmt (i) = (1  c)xxt (i), where
xxt (i) represents exports from the home country and x
m
t (i) represents imports into the
foreign country.
Traded goods from domestic and foreign rms are then combined into one aggre-
gate traded good. As in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1998), domestically supplied and
imported traded inputs are aggregated by the following:
xt =
"R n
0 x
d
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
  1

+
R 1
n x
m
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
  1

# 
 1
(III.3)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic traded goods varieties and  is
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties.
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If we assume that the domestic elasticity of substitution is equal to the interna-
tional elasticity of substitution,  = , then this aggregation equation is identical to that
in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995):
xt =
hR n
0 x
d
t (i)
 1
 di

+
R 1
n x
m
t (i)
 1
 di
i 
 1
(III.4)
This aggregate traded good is combined with the output from non-traded goods
rms to create the nal good. Output from non-traded goods rms is simply a function of
domestic labor and capital, yt = (h
y
t )
1 
(Kyt )
, where hyt is the labor input into production
of non-traded goods, andKyt is the capital input. The combination of traded and non-traded
goods into one nal good is:
Yt =
h
()
1
 (yt)
 1
 + (1  ) 1 (xt)
 1

i 
 1
(III.5)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between traded and non-traded goods and  is the
relative size of non-traded goods in gross output.
Households
Households in the home country are indexed j 2 [0; n] and in the foreign country
they are indexed j 2 (n; 1]. The household derives utility from private consumption, Ct (j),
and disutility from labor, ht (j). Household j will maximize the discounted value of future
utility given by the following:
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U (j) = E
1P
t=0
tU [Ct (j) ; ht (j) ;Ct 1] (III.6)
where
U [Ct (j) ; ht (j) ;Ct 1] = ln (Ct (j)  bCt 1)   (ht (j))2 (III.7)
subject to the households budget constraint:
Pt (Ct(j) + It(j) + Tt(j)) + (III.8)
Bt(j)  (1 + it 1)Bt 1(j) + Et
 
BFt (j)  (1 + it 1)BFt 1(j)

= Wt (j)ht(j) +Rtk
s
t (j) +
Z n
0
t(j; i)di  Pt
bf
2

EtB
F
t (j)
Pt
  nfaFss
2
where Ct 1 is the previous periods per capita consumption (taken as exogenous by the
household), It(j) is investment in household js stock of physical capital, Tt(j) is a lump
sum tax paid by household j, which nances government spending, nGt =
R n
0 Tt(j)dj, Bt(j)
is the households stock of nominal bonds denominated in the home currency, BFt (j) is a
stock of foreign currency nominal bonds, Et is the nominal exchange rate, Wt (j) is the
households nominal wage rate, Rt is the rental rate on capital, kst (j) is capital supplied
by the household to domestic rms, and bf represents a small quadratic cost to holding
foreign bonds.2
A capital appreciation function with quadratic adjustment costs describes the evo-
2This quadratic cost term is a reduced form representation of a debt-elastic interest premium. For
simplicity we keep the interest rate paid on bonds equal to the nominal risk free rate, it, and the fact that
the risk premium on bonds is a function of indebtedness is instead captured by the quadratic cost term.
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) show that the two modeling techniques are nearly quantitatively identical.
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lution of the households capital stock:
Kt+1 (j) = [1   (zt (j))]Kt (j) + 

It (j)
Kt (j)

Kt (j) (III.9)
where 0 > 0 and 00 < 0.
Households not only choose a capital stock but they also choose a capital utilization
rate. The depreciation rate is a function of the utilization rate, zt (j),  (zt (j)) =  +

1+
h
(zt (j))
1+   1
i
where  = 1   1 +  is derived from the rst order condition with
respect to the utilization rate. Capital is perfectly substitutable across households, so the
aggregate capital supplied in the home country is:
Kst =
Z n
0
kst (j) dj =
Z n
0
zt (j)Kt 1 (j) dj = nztKt 1 (III.10)
Households also supply a di¤erentiated type of labor. The per capita labor supplied
by household j is h (j). The aggregate labor supply is given by:
hst =
Z n
0
ht (j)
 1
 dj
 
 1
(III.11)
where  is the elasticity of substitution across households of their di¤erentiated labor.
Market Clearing Conditions
The gross output in the home country, Yt, is used for private consumption, in-
vestment, and government spending. If C (j) and I (j) are consumption and investment by
household j, and Gt is per capital government spending:
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Yt =
Z n
0
(Ct (j) + It (j)) dj + nGt = n (Ct + It +Gt) (III.12)
Labor and capital are both supplied to domestic traded and non-traded good rms.
hst =
Z n
0
hxt (i) di+ h
y
t (III.13)
Kst =
Z n
0
Kxt (i) di+K
y
t
The only nancial assets traded internationally are non-contingent bonds denom-
inated in units of the home currency, B, and units of the foreign currency, BF . The bond
markets must clear internationally:
Z n
0
Bt (j) dj +
Z 1
n
Bt (j) dj = 0 (III.14)Z n
0
BFt (j) dj +
Z 1
n
BFt (j) dj = 0
Monetary Policy
The central bank in each country follows a Taylor rule with smoothing and the
supply of money is perfectly elastic at the desired nominal interest rate, it.
1 + it
1 + iss
=

1 + it 1
1 + iss
i n
(t 1)p (1 +OGt)y
o1 i
where t = PtPt 4 and OGt =
GDPt
GDPss
  1.
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Nominal Rigidities
In the model, wages and traded goods prices are sticky. We use a Calvo price and
wage setting framework, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).
Sticky Wages
In any given period, household j faces a probability of 1 w of being able to reset
their wage, otherwise it is reset automatically according to Wt (j) = t 1Wt 1 (j), where
t 1 =
Pt 1
Pt 2 .
If household j is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage to
maximize the expected present value of utility from consumption minus the disutility of
labor.
Et
1P
l=0
l (w)
l
n
t+lt;t+lWt (j)h
s
t+l (j)   
 
hst+l (j)
2o (III.15)
where t+l is the marginal utility of consumption in period t+ l.3
t;t+l =
8>><>>:
1 if l = 0
t+l 1t;t+l 1 if l > 0
The imperfect combination of labor from di¤erent households is described in
(III.11). Use this function to derive the demand function for labor from a specic household:
hst (j) =

Wt (j)
Wt
 
hst (III.16)
3We assume complete contingent claims markets within a country. This implies that the marginal utility
of consumption is the same across all households within a country, regardless of their income. Therefore
the total utility from the consumption of labor income in any period is simply the country specic marginal
utility of income, t, multiplied by the households labor income, Wt (j)hst (j).
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whereWt =
R n
0 Wt (j)
1  dj
 1
1 
is the average wage across households, and hst is aggregate
labor supplied by domestic households.
The household will choose ~Wt (j) to maximize (III.15) subject to (III.16). Details
from the solution to this maximization problem and the derivation of ~Wt (j) can be found
in the appendix.
If we substitute ~Wt (j) into the expression for the average wage rate Wt; we can
derive an expression for the evolution of the average wage. With this expression it is clear
how the Calvo framework makes wages sticky:
Wt =

w (t 1;tWt 1)
1  + (1  w)

~Wt
1  11 
(III.17)
Sticky Prices
In the model, traded goods prices are sticky. The output from traded goods rms
is both sold domestically and exported. Therefore the rm sets prices for both the domestic
market and the foreign market.
In period t, the rm will be able to change its price with probability 1  p. If the
rm cannot change prices then domestic prices are indexed by the previous periods domestic
ination rate, and export prices are indexed by the previous periods foreign ination rate.
The rm that can reset prices in period t will choose P dt (i) and P
x
t (i) to maximize
discounted future prots from both the domestic and foreign markets given by:
51
max
P dt (i)
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	 MCt+l 
where MCt+l is marginal cost of production in period t+ l:
The degree to which traded goods rms are able to price discriminate, and thus
charge di¤erent prices for the domestic and export markets, has potential implications for
cross-country price dynamics. Therefore, we follow Betts and Devereux (2000) and assume
that a fraction s of traded goods producing rms can set di¤erent prices for the domestic and
export markets (i.e. they can Price to Market), while the other 1  s cannot. Without loss
of generality assume that rms indexed i 2 [0; ns] can price-to-market and those indexed
i 2 (ns; n] cannot.
The key di¤erence between rms that can price-to-market and those that cannot
is that the rms that can price-to-market choose both P dt (i) and P
x
t (i). Firms that cannot
price-to-market can only choose P dt (i) = P
x
t (i).
Details from the solution to these maximization problems can be found in the
appendix.
Model Calibration
Parameter Values
The various parameters used in the model and their values are listed in table 6.
The rst seven parameters, including the discount factor, the elasticity of sub-
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Table 6. Parameter values for the model in chapter III
Symbol Value Description
 4
p
1:03 discount factor
 6 elasticity of substitution (eos) between traded goods
b :65 coe¢ cient on lagged consumption in the utility function
 :36 capital share in production of value added
 21 eos between labor from di¤erent households
p 0:6 probability that a traded goods rm cannot reset prices
w 0:64 probability that a household cannot reset wages
i 0:9 smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule
p 1:5 exponent on ination in the Taylor rule
y 0:5 exponent on the output gap in the Taylor rule
b 0:02 quadratic cost of holding foreign bonds
 5 eos between domestic and imported goods
 1 elasticity of the depreciation rate with respect to the utilization rate
 0:025 capital depreciation rate
 2 eos between traded and non-traded goods
s 0:5 share of rms that can price-to-market
 :75 share of non-traded goods in nal goods
n 0:25 country size parameter, U.S.
n 0:05 country size parameter, UK
stitution between traded goods from domestic rms, the coe¢ cient that describes habit
formation in consumption, the capital share, the elasticity of substitution across di¤er-
entiated labor, and the two Calvo price setting parameters, are all taken from Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). The next four parameters, the three Taylor rule parameters
and the quadratic cost to holding foreign bonds, are from the Bank of England Quarterly
Model (47). The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods, , is from
Imbs and Mejean (2008). The next two parameters, the elasticity of the depreciation rate
with respect to the utilization rate, , and the steady state depreciation rate, , are from
Baxter and Farr (2005). The share of rms that can price-to-market, s, is from Choudhri,
Faruqee and Hakura (2005). Finally, the share of non-traded goods in the consumption
basket, , and the country size parameters for both the U.S. and the UK, n, are from the
authors own calculations.
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Shock Process
Since we use the model as a data generating process to estimate the parameters
of the Phillips curve, we want to restrict the shocks driving the model to shocks that lead
to a movement along the Phillips curve.
Shocks to total factor productivity, the driving process of most real business cycle
models, can a¤ect the marginal cost of production and lead to shifts in the short-run Phillips
curve. Similarly, money supply shocks4, a common feature of many new Keynesian DSGE
models, can a¤ect ination expectations and lead to shifts in the short-run Phillips curve.
To concentrate on movements along the Phillips curve, we restrict our attention to real
demand shocks, which can be represented by government spending shocks.
To ensure that any measured e¤ect of foreign output on domestic ination is
endogenous and not due to the exogenous shock process, we model shocks to home and
foreign government spending as independent AR(1) processes:
G^t = G^t 1 + gt
G^t = G^

t 1 + g

t
where  = 0:65 is from Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). Given that the shock
processes are identical across the two countries and the model is solved using a rst order
approximation, the variance of the innovations to government spending, gt and gt , is simply
normalized to one.
4which in this model with a central bank with a Taylor rule could be represented as monetary policy
shocks.
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Results
Impulse Responses
In order to gain intuition for how trade openness a¤ects ination dynamics, we
will calculate some impulse responses for domestic output and ination in response to a
government spending shock, both at home and abroad.
Figure 2 presents the responses of home ination and output to a home government
spending shock. In gure 2 the model has been calibrated such that the home country has
the same relative size as the U.S., about 25% of world GDP. This gure shows the response
of ination and output under two scenarios. One of trade autarky and one of costless
international trade. They key point to notice is that output follows nearly the same path
regardless of trade openness, however home ination is noticeably less responsive to the
shock under costless international trade. This suggests that trade openness may lower the
coe¢ cient on the domestic output gap in the Phillips curve.
Figure 3 presents the responses of consumer price ination and import ination to
a foreign government spending shock. The model is still calibrated for a large country, and
we again present the responses under both autarky and costless trade. Not surprisingly,
domestic ination doesnt respond to the foreign shock under autarky. The top panel in
gure 3 shows that under costless trade, domestic ination responds positively to a positive
foreign demand shock. However this does not necessarily imply that under costless trade
domestic ination responds to measures of foreign slack. The bottom panel in the gure
charts the path of domestic import price ination to the same foreign demand shock. The
paths of consumer price ination and import ination are qualitatively similar. This implies
that in a Phillips curve regression, there may not be any information in the foreign output
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Figure 2. Response of home ination and output to a home government spending shock.
Calibrated for a large country.
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Figure 3. Response of home consumer price ination and import price ination to a foreign
government spending shock. Calibrated for a large country.
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gap that is not already captured by import price ination. Therefore in a regression that
already contains import prices, the foreign output gap may not be signicant.
Figures 4 and 5 present the same impulse responses, just now the model is cali-
brated such that the home country has the same size as the UK, about 5% of world GDP.
The response of ination and output to a home shock seems to be independent of country
size, for gures 2 and 4 are nearly identical. This suggests that any e¤ect of globalization on
the slope of the Phillips curve does not depend on country size. A comparison of gures 3
and 5 shows that the response of consumer price ination and import ination to a foreign
demand shock are smaller in a small country, but for the small country we see again that the
paths of consumer price ination and import ination are qualitatively similar, questioning
how much new information about domestic ination is contained in the foreign output gap.
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Figure 4. Response of home ination and output to a home government spending shock.
Calibrated for a small country.
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Figure 5. Response of home consumer price ination and import price ination to a foreign
government spending shock. Calibrated for a small country.
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A Phillips Curve Regression
Impulse responses give a good visual interpretation of the e¤ect of globalization
on ination dynamics, but in order to quantify any e¤ect, we need to turn to Phillips curve
regressions.
There are two issues that plague empirical studies that attempt to nd the e¤ect
of globalization on the Phillips curve.
The rst is a problem with identifying the root cause of any empirical results. If
your empirical results show that domestic ination is becoming less responsive to move-
ments in the domestic output gap and at the same time it is becoming more responsive to
movements in the foreign output gap, how do you know that these e¤ects are being driven
by globalization? Equally plausible theories for the attening of the Phillips curve cite the
changing nature of shocks, or better monetary policy which serves to better anchor ination
expectations.
The second is a problem with data availability, which can make it di¢ cult to
separately identify the e¤ects of both the domestic output gap and the foreign output gap
on domestic ination. This is especially true when lags of ination are included in the
regression model in order to correct for any serial correlation in the data.
The DSGE model presented in this paper is used to generate data. The simulated
model can produce time series observations of ination and output that can then be used
to estimate a Phillips curve, as in previous empirical studies. Using a model to generate
data ensures that data availability is not an issue.
Also with the model we can preform a type of comparative statics exercise. We can
generate data and estimate a Phillips curve under one level of trade integration, and then
repeat after changing the trade cost parameter c while holding everything else constant.
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Thus we see how the estimated Phillips curve coe¢ cients change when only the level of
trade integration changes.
We use the Phillips curve regression framework from Ihrig et al. (2007). This
contains su¢ cient lags of ination in order to correct for any serial correlation in the error
term.
t = +
P6
i=1 it i +
P5
i=0 i (pm;t i   t i 1) + OGt + OGt + "t (III.18)
where t = 4

Pt
Pt 1   1

is the annualized quarterly ination rate, pm;t is the annualized
quarterly import price ination rate, OGt is the domestic output gap, and OGt is the
foreign output gap.
We use a Monte Carlo methods to estimate the Phillips curve parameters in (III.18)
and their standard errors. This not only allows us to nd the true Phillips curve coe¢ cients
but also nd condence bands and thus compare our results to those from previous empirical
papers. For instance, some previous empirical studies found that the foreign output gap has
an insignicant e¤ect on domestic ination,  in (III.18) is insignicant. This can happen
if the true  is zero, or if the true  is positive but small and the relatively short time series
of observations leads to wide condence bands.
For each iteration in our Monte Carlo estimation, a time series of 100 observations
is generated5. With these observations, we estimate (III.18) using OLS. This process is
repeated 1000 times. The 1000 di¤erent estimates of the Phillips curve parameters are
averaged to nd a true values of each parameter, and the 97:5 and 2:5 percentiles of each
parameter are calculated in order to construct 95% condence bands.
5The model is calibrated for quarterly frequency, so 100 observations corresponds to a time series of 25
years of observations. In their empirical studies, Borio and Filardo (2007) use 21-26 years of observations
and Ihrig, et al. (2007) use 29 years of observations.
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To answer the question of how will globalization a¤ect the Phillips curve, we use
our model and this Phillips curve regression framework in two ways. First, we calibrate
the model to match historical levels of trade integration in the U.S. and the UK. Thus we
can calculate how the globalization of the past 30 years has a¤ected the Phillips curve.
Then we estimate how the Phillips curve is a¤ected as we vary the level of trade integration
from complete autarky to free trade, and thus see how future globalization might a¤ect the
relationship between output and ination.
The Phillips curve over the last thirty years
The model is calibrated to reect levels of trade integration in the U.S. and the UK
in both the late 1970s and in 2000. Since both traded and non-traded goods are present in
the model, trade integration is dened as the import penetration ratio among traded goods.
These import penetration ratios and their corresponding trade cost parameters are found
in table 7.6
Table 7. Historical import ratios and their corresponding trade cost parameters.
US UK
Import Ratio Trade Cost Import ratio Trade Cost
2000 0:261 0:381 0:439 0:478
1970s 0:094 0:545 0:256 0:575
Notes: The import ratios are converted into trade costs assuming
a relative country size of 0:25 for the US and 0:05 for the UK.
The exact calculation of how import ratios are converted into trade
costs can be found in a footnote in the text.
The estimated Phillips curves under our four model calibrations are presented in
table 8. The rst four columns in the table report the regression results from using the
6The demand functions in (A.17) and (A.18) in the appendix can be used to nd the implied trade cost
for a given import penetration ratio and country size. If s is the import penetration ratio, dened as total
expenditure on imports divided by total expenditure on imports plus total expenditure on domestic goods,
then c = 1 

s
1 s
 1
 1

n
1 n
 1
 1
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model as the data generating process. In the rst two columns, the model is calibrated to
match the relative size of the U.S.. In the third and fourth columns the model is calibrated
to match the relative size of the UK. The empirical estimation results from Ihrig et al.
are reproduced in the fth and sixth columns. These empirical results are reported to
show that the data generating process in the model yields Phillips curve estimates that are
quantitatively similar to those found in the data.
Table 8. Phillips curve regression results, using the model as the data generating process.
US UK Ihrig et al.
1977 2000 1979 2000 US UK
Lagged Ination, sum 1:008 1:014 1:014 1:018 0:976 0:918
SE (0:025) (0:027) (0:029) (0:031) (0:031) (0:054)
Import price, sum 0:112 0:199 0:157 0:234 0:024  0:035
SE (0:050) (0:074) (0:061) (0:091) (0:025) (0:051)
Domestic Output Gap 0:094 0:076 0:092 0:079 0:179 0:245
SE (0:030) (0:025) (0:032) (0:028) (0:052) (0:113)
Foreign Output Gap  0:014 0:002  0:004 0:006  0:157  0:081
SE (0:021) (0:018) (0:024) (0:021) (0:087) (0:211)
Adj R2 0:969 0:972 0:967 0:971 0:958 0:868
Notes: Model calibrated to match country size and import ratio for U.S. in 1977 and
2000, and for UK in 1979 and 2000. Monte Carlo estimated standard errors in
parentheses. The Ihrig, et al. regressions also include lagged food and energy price
ination and dummy variables to account for tax changes.
Turning to the rst four columns, the coe¢ cient on the domestic output gap falls
with greater trade integration. This is true regardless of whether the model is calibrated
for a large country or whether it is calibrated for a small country. Thus increased trade
integration since the late 1970s has caused a attening of the Phillips curve. The magnitude
of the change is small, less than one standard deviation. Therefore it is not surprising that
empirical studies would nd that trade integration has no role in the attening of the
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Phillips curve.
Similarly, the coe¢ cient on the foreign output gap is small and insignicant in
every case. While there is a slight increase in the coe¢ cient on the foreign output gap, it
is so small that under current levels of trade integration, the foreign output gap doesnt
contain any new information for ination dynamics that is not already captured by import
price ination.
The Phillips curve over the full range of trade integration
The Phillips curve results presented thus far conrm the empirical ndings in Ihrig
et al. (2007). Globalization over the past 30 years has not signicantly altered ination
dynamics. The Phillips curve has gotten atter, but not noticeably so. The foreign output
gap contains no information that is not already conveyed by import price ination. These
results are found from calibrating the model to reect trade integration in the late 1970s
and 2000. What if the model is simulated over the entire range of trade integration, from
autarky to free trade?
Figures 6 and 7 plot the coe¢ cients on the domestic and foreign output gaps across
the full range of trade integration. Specically, we simulate the model under various trade
cost parameters, c, ranging from c close to one (autarky) to c = 0 (free trade in tradeable
goods). The two vertical lines in each plot refer to the trade cost parameters in the late
1970s and in 2000 that were used to calculate the regression results in table 8.
The top panel in both gures shows that as trade costs decrease, the coe¢ cient
on the domestic output gap will decrease. Thus increased trade integration causes a slight
attening of the Phillips curve. However to put this in perspective, the two vertical lines
show how little the Phillips curve has attened given the trade integration of the past 30
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Figure 6. Phillips curve coe¢ cients on the domestic and foreign output gaps over a range of
trade integration. Dashed lines represent 95% condence intervals. Calibrated for a large
country.
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Figure 7. Phillips curve coe¢ cients on the domestic and foreign output gaps over a range of
trade integration. Dashed lines represent 95% condence intervals. Calibrated for a small
country.
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years, and the gures show that even moving from the current level of trade integration to
costless trade would not have a great e¤ect on the slope of the Phillips curve.
The bottom panel of both gures shows that as trade costs decrease, the coe¢ -
cient on the foreign output gap increases. However the two vertical lines show that under
current levels of trade integration, it is for all practical purposes zero. Furthermore the
condence bands show that in an estimation using 25 years of observations, the coe¢ cient
is insignicant across the entire range of trade costs. Therefore, regardless of the level of
trade integration, an empirical study would conclude that the foreign output gap conveys no
information about ination dynamics that is not already captured by import price ination.
A comparison across the two gures shows how globalization may a¤ect the Phillips
curve di¤erently in a small country than in a large country. The plots are slightly steeper in
the UK than in the U.S., implying that trade integration has a somewhat greater e¤ect on
the coe¢ cients of the Phillips curve in a small country. But the plots are still very similar,
implying that country size plays little role in the e¤ect of globalization on the Phillips curve.
Summary and Conclusion
The sensitivity of ination to movements in the domestic and foreign output gaps
is of paramount importance to monetary policy makers. Understanding how measures of
domestic and foreign slack a¤ect ination allows for a better ination forecast. Also, the
sensitivity of ination to movements in domestic output determines the sacrice ratio, the
short run trade o¤ between ination and output that the central bank must keep in mind
when determining monetary policy. It is for these reasons that the e¤ects of globalization
on the sensitivity of ination to domestic and foreign output conditions has garnered so
much attention both among academic researchers and policy makers.
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This paper set out to answer with a quantitative model, what is the e¤ect of
increased trade integration on the sensitivity of ination to domestic and foreign output
conditions. The results clearly show that as an economy moves from a state of autarky
to costless trade, ination becomes less sensitive to movements in the domestic output
gap. However, the quantitative impact is small. When we use as a benchmark the trade
integration of the past 30 years, the Phillips curve has attened only slightly, and certainly
not enough to be picked up by empirical studies.
Furthermore, we nd that increased trade integration will increase the sensitivity
of ination to the foreign output gap, but again, the quantitative impact is small. Under
current levels of trade integration, the foreign output gap provides no information about
domestic ination that is not already conveyed by the movements in import prices. Moving
to a state of costless trade, the foreign output gap has a small role in the determination
of domestic ination, but Monte Carlo simulations show that the e¤ect is so small that it
would be deemed insignicant by most empirical studies.
The implications for monetary policy are clear. Dont worry about the e¤ect of
globalization on the Phillips curve. Increased trade integration will lessen the sensitivity
of ination to movements in the domestic output gap, but the e¤ect is small. Too small
to have any statistical signicance, and thus too small to have an e¤ect on either ination
forecasting or the sacrice ratio. Similarly, increased trade integration will increase the
sensitivity of ination to foreign output, but this e¤ect is small, and when we control for
import prices, the foreign output gap provides no signicant information about domestic
ination. Thus, if import price ination is included in the Phillips curve, there is no need
to include the foreign output gap.
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CHAPTER IV
VARIABLE MARKUPS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLE CO-MOVEMENT
Introduction
In the lead up to the introduction of the euro, a number of authors began to empir-
ically measure the e¤ect of bilateral trade intensity on bilateral business cycle correlation.
The goal was to nd if the increased trade arising from the introduction of a common cur-
rency would help the members of a currency union meet Mundells Optimum Currency Area
Criteria. A number of papers, including Frankel and Rose (1998), Clark and van Wincoop
(2001), Imbs (2004 and 2006), Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), and Calderon et al. (2007)
have all measured the e¤ect of bilateral trade on bilateral business cycle correlation and
found that trade has a positive and signicant e¤ect on cyclical co-movement.
This robust and intuitive empirical nding is rather di¢ cult to reproduce with
a model. The international real business cycle model (IRBC) from Backus et al. (1992)
actually predicts that trade has a negative e¤ect on cyclical co-movement, as trade allows
production to be located in the country that enjoys temporarily higher relative productivity.
By restricting the international asset market, Baxter and Crucini (1995), Heathcote and
Perri (2002), and Kose and Yi (2001 and 2006) show that the IRBC model can replicate the
positive e¤ect of trade on co-movement. Similarly, Ambler et al. (2002) show that when
trade consists of intermediate goods, the model can also replicate the positive e¤ect of trade
on co-movement.
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These models all assume that rms face a constant elasticity of demand, and thus
price is a constant markup over marginal cost. The e¤ect of variable demand elasticities and
thus variable markups on output co-movement has thus far been neglected in the literature.1
The model in this paper is a discretized version of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) mo-
nopolistic competition model. This was introduced in the closed economy case by Yang and
Heijdra (1993), and has been used in recent macro applications by Eckel (2008), Jaimovich
and Floetto (2008), and Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
The model predicts that a rms pricing power is an increasing function of its
market share. We apply this model in an international setting. The mechanism that drives
the results of this paper is that the pricing power of a domestic rm is a decreasing function
of the import share. This intuitive result has support in both the industrial organization
and international trade literatures.
Tybout (2003) provides a comprehensive survey of the evidence on how markups
generally fall with the degree of import competition.2
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show the (short run) signicance of the pro-competitive
e¤ect of trade in a model that incorporates the selection e¤ect of trade featured in Melitz
(2003). Chen et al. (2009) empirically test the models predictions. Using EU manufactur-
ing data from the 1990s they nd in accordance with the theoretical model that increased
trade openness has a negative e¤ect on domestic markups in the short run.3
At business cycle frequencies, country specic business cycle uctuations can lead
1Since variable markups are a type of real rigidity that prevent changes in real marginal costs from passing
through into prices, models with variable markups have tended to focus on prices and exchange rates. See
Dotsey and King (2005), Gust et al. (2006), Bouakez (2006) and Sbordone (2007)
2See also Katics and Peterson (1994), Tribble (1995), Becarello (1997), Konings and Vandenbussche
(2005), and Blonigen et al. (2007)
3The Melitz and Ottaviano model also contains a long run channel whereby the selection e¤ect of trade
in a heterogeneous rm model can actually lead to higher markups in the long run. Chen et al. conrm
this by nding that trade may have an ambiguous e¤ect on markups in the long run. However, this paper
is concerned with the cyclical e¤ects of trade on markups, so we are not concerned with the long-run e¤ects
due to heterogeneous rms.
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to cyclical changes in the import share, which can lead to cyclical changes in domestic and
foreign rmspricing power, and thus their markup.
This markup variability leads to greater international business cycle correlation.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose there is a positive shock to foreign productivity. Then
foreign marginal costs fall. The relative price of foreign products decreases. Foreign produc-
ers will increase production and domestic producers will cut production. Thus the foreign
shock leads to business cycle divergence.
Foreign producers will gain market share at the expense of domestic producers,
and thus foreign markups increase while domestic markups fall. These changes in markups
cause the relative price of foreign goods to increase. Thus variability in markups causes a
change in relative prices that is exactly opposite to the change due to the initial productivity
shock. Home and foreign business cycles will diverge less than they would have without
variable markups.
Thus markup variability has a qualitative e¤ect on business cycle correlation. In
this paper we will quantify that e¤ect and show that markup variability has a signicant
e¤ect on cyclical correlation. Furthermore we show that a real business cycle model with
endogenous markup variability can reproduce the positive e¤ect of trade on co-movement.
This paper will proceed as follows. In the next section the model is described
and a part of the model is solved in order to nd a closed form expression for a rms
elasticity of demand as a function of its market share. The parameterization of the model
and the exogenous shock process is described in the third section. The results from the
model are presented in the fourth section. First we log linearize part of the model to
provide some intuition for how markup variability should a¤ect co-movement. Then we
simulate the model to show the quantitative e¤ect of endogenous markup variability on
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cyclical co-movement. Finally, the fth section concludes.
The Model
Technology
There are two countries, home and foreign. Foreign variables are written with a
 and home variables are not. In the following description of the model, foreign equations
are omitted for brevity.
A nal aggregate good is used by households for consumption and investment, Ct
and It. This nal good, yt, is formed by aggregating goods from di¤erent sectors, y
j
t . The
sector level outputs are combined using the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator:
Ct + It = yt =
R 1
0

yjt
  1

dj
 
 1
. (IV.1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution across goods from di¤erent sectors.
Household expenditure minimization can be used to nd the demand for the ag-
gregate consumer good in sector j as a function of aggregate consumption:
yjt =

pjt
 
yt. (IV.2)
where pjt is the price of output from sector j relative to the price of nal output. From
this demand function, we can nd the real exchange rate between the two countries. The
price of the foreign consumption good in terms of the home consumption good is qt = R 1
0
(pjt )
1 
djR 1
0
(pjt)
1 
dj
! 1
1 
.
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Final output in sector j is the combination of domestic and imported goods from
sector j. The two are combined with an Armington (1969) aggregator function:
yjt =
"
1
2
 1
 
yjD;t
  1

+

1
2
 1
 
yjM;t
  1

# 
 1
. (IV.3)
where yjD;t is the domestic variety, y
j
M;t is imported, and  is the elasticity of substitution
between them. We assume  > . Thus home and foreign varieties from the same sector
are more substitutable than goods from di¤erent sectors.4
This aggregation function is used to nd the demands for the imported and do-
mestic varieties of the good from sector j:
yjD;t =
1
2
 
pjD;t
pjt
! 
yjt (IV.4)
yjM;t =
1
2
 
pjM;t
pjt
! 
yjt .
where pjD;t and p
j
M;t are the relative prices of domestically supplied and imported goods
from sector j and pjt =

1
2

pjD;t
1 
+ 12

pjM;t
1  11 
.
Goods shipped internationally are subject to an iceberg trade cost, so when 1 unit
of a good is shipped, only 1   c units arrive. Thus yjX;t =
yjM;t
(1 c) and y
j
X;t =
yjM;t
(1 c) , where
yjX;t and y
j
X;t are home and foreign exports in sector j. We assume that transport rms are
perfectly competitive, so pjM;t = qt
pjX;t
1 c , where p
j
X;t is the relative price of foreign exported
goods.
The domestically supplied good from sector j, yjD;t, is formed from the combination
4We assume that there is no exogenous home bias, commonly refered to as ! in the Armington aggregator
function. The iceberg trade costs will bias consumers towards home goods, and the trade cost parameter
is calibrated so that the model reects trade volumes observed in the data, so it would be superuous to
include an exogenous home bias parameter.
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of rm level varieties from the N domestic rms in sector j.
yjD;t =
"
NP
i=1

1
N
 1

yjD;t (i)
 1

# 
 1
(IV.5)
where yjD;t (i) is the domestic output from rm i in sector j and  is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between varieties from di¤erent rms. There is also a corresponding aggregation
function for exports that yields yjX;t.
We assume that the N di¤erent varieties are imperfect substitutes, thus  < 1.
We also assume that   , and thus there is greater substitutability across domestic
varieties than between domestic and foreign varieties.
Given this aggregation function, the demand for output from rm i in sector j is:
yjD;t (i) =
1
N
 
pjD;t (i)
pjD;t
! 
yjD (IV.6)
yjX;t (i) =
1
N
 
pjX;t (i)
pjX;t
! 
yjX
where pjD (i) and p
j
X (i) are the domestic and export prices for output from rm i in sector
j. Furthermore, pjD;t =

NP
i=1
 
1
N

pjD;t (i)
1 
 1
1 
and pjX;t =

NP
i=1
 
1
N

pjX;t (i)
1 
 1
1 
Firm i in sector j combines domestic capital and labor to make a good that can
be sold domestically or exported.
yjD;t (i) + y
j
X;t (i) = At

N jt (i)
1  
Kjt (i)
    (IV.7)
whereN jt (i) andK
j
t (i) is labor and capital employed by rm i in sector j, At is an exogenous
country specic productivity shock, and  is a xed cost which ensures that rms earn zero
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prot in the steady state..
Households
The one representative household per country derives utility from consumption
and leisure. The household in the home country maximizes expected lifetime utility given
by:
E0
1P
t=o
t
1
1  
h
(1 Nt) (Ct)1 
i1 
(IV.8)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and Nt =
R 1
0
NP
i=1
N jt (i) dj is aggregate labor
supplied by the domestic household to all rms i in all sectors j.
We assume that international asset markets are complete. We can model this by
assuming households share one worldwide budget constraint:
Ct+It+qt (C

t + I

t ) = wtNt+rtKt+
R 1
0
NP
i=1
jt (i) dj+qt

wtN

t + r

tK

t +
R 1
0
NP
i=1
jt (i) dj

(IV.9)
where wt is the home wage rate (in terms of the home consumption good), rt is the rental
rate of home capital, Kt =
R 1
0
NP
i=1
Kjt (i) dj, and 
j
t (i) = p
j
D;t (i) y
j
D;t (i) + p
j
X;t (i) y
j
X;t (i)  
wtN
j
t (i)  rtKjt (i) is the prot at time t of the home rm i in sector j.
Finally, the home capital stock evolves according to the following:
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It (IV.10)
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where  is the one-period depreciation rate of capital.
The rms maximization problem
Firm i in sector j chooses pjD;t (i), p
j
X;t (i), y
j
D;t (i), and y
j
X;t (i) to solve the following
static maximization problem:
max

pjD;t (i) y
j
D;t (i) + p
j
X;t (i) y
j
X;t (i)  wtN jt (i)  rtKjt (i)

(IV.11)
This prot can be rewritten as:
max
h
pjD;t (i) MCt

yjD;t (i) +

pjX;t (i) MCt

yjX;t (i) MCt 
i
(IV.12)
where MCt = 1At

wt
1 
1   
rt

.
We assume a su¢ cient degree of market segmentation such that rms can price to
market, i.e. the rm is able to set a di¤erent price for goods sold domestically versus those
that are exported.5
If rms are engaged in quantity competition then the rm chooses domestic and
export quantities according to:
yjD;t (i) = argmax
yjD;t(i)
n
pjD;t (i) MCt

yjD;t (i)
o
(IV.13)
yjX;t (i) = argmax
yjX;t(i)
n
pjX;t (i) MCt

yjX;t (i)
o
subject to the inverse demand functions:
5We assume market segmentation in the benchmark case, but when we test the sensitivity of the main
results, we will consider one case where rms must set the same price for both the domestic and export
markets.
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pjD;t (i) =
 
N
yjD;t (i)
yjD
! 1

 
2
yjD;t
yjt
! 1

 
yjt
yt
! 1

(IV.14)
pjX;t (i) =
1  c
qt
 
N
yjX;t (i)
yjX
! 1

 
2
yjM;t
yjt
! 1

 
yjt
yt
! 1

Thus the domestic and export elasticities of demand faced by the rm are:
"d =

1


1  sjt

+ sjt

1

mt +
1

(1 mt)
 1
(IV.15)
"x =

1


1  sjt

+ sjt

1


1 mjt

+
1

mt
 1
where sjt =
pjD;t(i)y
j
D;t(i)PN
j=1 p
j
D;t(j)y
j
D;t(j)
is the rms market share among its domestic competitors,
mt =
pjM;ty
j
M;t
pjD;ty
j
D;t+p
j
M;ty
j
M;t
is the import share in the home market, and mt is the import share
in the foreign market. In equilibrium all domestic rms are identical, so sjt =
1
N .
If instead rms engaged in price competition the demand elasticities would be the
following:
"d = 

1  sjt

+ sjt (mt +  (1 mt)) (IV.16)
"x = 

1  sjt

+ sjt ( (1 mt ) + mt )
Details of the solution to the rms problem and how these elasticities are derived
can be found in the appendix.
This expression for demand elasticity is simply one convex combination of elastici-
ties nested inside another convex combination of elasticities. The inner convex combination,
mt+ (1 mt), describes the demand elasticity faced by the domestic industry. This elas-
ticity is a weighted average of the elasticity of substitution across home and foreign varieties
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and the elasticity of substitution across goods from di¤erent sectors. The weight is the im-
port share. In a relatively closed economy, the domestic producers in sector j compete
mainly with producers in other sectors, and the elasticity of substitution between goods
from di¤erent sectors is . As the economy becomes more open and the import share
increases, domestic producers in sector j face greater competition from foreign producers
in the same sector, and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign varieties
is . Since  < , the domestic industry loses pricing power as they face greater foreign
competition.
The outer convex combination describes the pricing power of the individual rm.
If the rm faces a lot of domestic competition and their relative share among domestic
producers is low, then the rms main competitors are not foreign producers or producers
in other sectors, but other domestic rms in the same sector. In this case the demand
elasticity is close to the elasticity of substitution between varieties from di¤erent domestic
rms, . As sjt increases then the rm can base their pricing decisions less on competition
with domestic rms in the same industry and more on competition with foreign producers
and other industries. If    > , then  > mt +  (1 mt), so as sjt increases, the rm
faces less domestic competition, the elasticity of demand falls, and the rm gains pricing
power.
Parameterization
The models parameters and their benchmark values are found in table 9.
The three parameters that describe the elasticity of substitution across goods are
, , and .  is the elasticity of substitution across domestic goods in the same sector.
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Table 9. Parameter values for the model in chapter IV
Symbol Value Description
 21 elasticity of substitution across domestic varieties
 1:01 elasticity of substitution across di¤erent sectors
 7:5 elasticity of substitution across home and foreign goods
 0:7 weight on leisure in the utility function
 2 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
 0:36 capitals share of income
 0:99 discount factor
 0:025 capital depreciation rate
 0:321 xed cost parameter (benchmark)
c 0:221 trade cost (benchmark)
d 20% steady state domestic markup
We set this elasticity equal to 21. Therefore as the number of rms in an industry, N ,
approaches innity, our model predicts a 5% markup as in Basu and Fernald (2002).
 is the elasticity of substitution between goods from di¤erent sectors. We fol-
low Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and set this parameter equal to 1:01. An elasticity of
substitution close to one ensures that sectoral expenditure shares are roughly constant.
The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, , can also be
thought of as the import demand elasticity. In a survey, Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004), conclude that this elasticity is somewhere between 5 and 10. In the benchmark
parameterization  = 7:5. We will also test the model using  = 10 and  = 5.
The next ve parameters: , the exponent on leisure in the Cobb-Douglas utility
function, , the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , capitals share of income, , the
discount factor, and , the capital depreciation rate, are all set to values commonly found
in the real business cycle literature.
The benchmark xed cost parameter,  , from the rms production function, is
set such that rms earn zero prot in the steady state.
The benchmark trade cost parameter, c, is set such that the import share is equal
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to 25% in the steady state.
The steady state domestic markup is equal to 20%. With this steady state domestic
markup, the number of rms, N , can be backed out of the elasticity expressions in (IV.15)
and (IV.16).6
Finally, in this real business cycle model, uctuations in total factor productivity
drive business cycle uctuations. The At and At variables in (IV.7) are exogenous country
specic shocks that evolve according to the following VAR(1) process:
2664 At+1
At+1
3775 =
2664 0:9 0
0 0:9
3775
2664 At
At
3775+
2664 "t
"t
3775
where var("t) =var("t ) = :008522 and corr("t; "t ) = :258
Results
Conceptual Issues
To see how variable markups a¤ect the cyclical uctuations in output, consider
the log linearization of the demand function for goods from domestic rms in (IV.4):
y^D;t =  p^D;t + p^t + y^t (IV.17)
Note that the sectoral superscripts j have been omitted for clarity.
If we log linearize the function that aggregates domestic and imported prices, then
6 = "
" 1   1. Under quantity competition, " =

1

 
1  1
N

+ 1
N

1

mt +
1

(1 mt)
 1
, thus
N =
(+1)

1

 

1

mt+
1

(1 mt)

1 (+1)(1  1 )
:Under price competition, " = 
 
1  1
N

+ 1
N
(mt +  (1 mt)), thus
N = ( (mt+(1 mt)))
+1 
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the sectoral price level p^t can be expressed as:
p^t = (1 m) p^D;t +mp^M;t (IV.18)
where m is the steady state import share.
Substituting equation (IV.18) into (IV.17) yields the following:
y^D;t = m (p^M;t   p^D;t) + y^t (IV.19)
The domestic price is simply equal to a markup over the domestic marginal cost
of production, pD;t = D;tMCt. The import price is equal to a markup multiplied by
the foreign marginal cost of production adjusted for trade costs and the real exchange
rate, pM;t =
qt
1 c

X;tMC

t . After log-linearizing these pricing formulas, the log-linearizaed
demand function in (IV.19) is:
y^D;t = m

q^t + ^

X;t +MC^

t   ^D;t  MC^t

+ y^t (IV.20)
Suppose that there is an exogenous change in the foreign marginal cost of produc-
tion, MCt . Equation (IV.20) shows that the elasticity of domestic demand with respect to
changes in foreign marginal cost is:
y^D;t
MC^t
= m
 
q^t
MC^t
+
^X;t
MC^t
+ 1  ^D;t
MC^t
  MC^t
MC^t
!
+
y^t
MC^t
(IV.21)
Suppose markups are constant, then
^X;t
MC^t
=
^D;t
MC^t
= 0. Then the elasticity in
(IV.21) can be rewritten as:
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y^D;t
MC^t
= m
 
q^t
MC^t
+ 1  MCt
MC^t
!
+
y^t
MC^t
(IV.22)
Therefore equations (IV.21) and (IV.22) show how the variability of markups can
a¤ect the cyclical uctuations in output. Dene  y^D;t
MC^t
to be the change in elasticity when
the variability of markups is taken into account7:

y^D;t
MC^t
= m
 
^X;t
MC^t
  ^D;t
MC^t
!
(IV.23)
In this model markup is an increasing function of market share. Therefore when
foreign costs increase, foreign producers lose market share in the domestic market and thus
their markup falls,
^X;t
MC^t
< 0. Similarly when foreign cost increase, domestic producers gain
market share and thus their markup increases,
^D;t
MC^t
> 0. This implies that  y^D;t
MC^t
< 0.
The key result from this paper is summarized in equation (IV.23).
Markup variability should lead to greater international business cycle correlation.
Suppose there is a positive shock to foreign productivity. Then foreign marginal costs fall.
The relative price of foreign products decreases. Foreign producers will increase production
and domestic producers will cut production. Thus the foreign shock leads to business cycle
divergence.
Foreign producers will gain market share at the expense of domestic producers,
and thus foreign markups increase while domestic markups fall. These changes in markups
cause the relative price of foreign goods to increase. Thus variability in markups causes a
7This expression for  y^D;t
MC^t
is an approximation. Other elasticities like the elasticity of the real exchange
rate with respect to changes in foreign marginal costs, q^t
MC^t
, the elasticity of home marginal costs, MC^t
MC^t
,
and the elasticity of home gross output, y^t
MC^t
, should all be a¤ected by the variability of markups.
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Figure 8. Response of home and foreign markups and GDP to a positive shock to foreign
productivity.
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change in relative prices that is exactly opposite to the change due to the initial productivity
shock. Home and foreign business cycles will diverge less than they would have without
variable markups.
This sequence of events is illustrated in gure 8. The gure plots the response of
home domestic markups and foreign export markups, and the response of home and foreign
GDP to a positive foreign productivity shock. The dotted line in each plot refers to the
path of markups and GDP when markups are constant. The solid line refers to the path
of markups and GDP in the model with variable markups arising from rms engaged in
quantity competition, as in (IV.15).8
The plots in gure 8 clearly show how markup variability tempers the response of
both home and foreign GDP. Following the positive foreign shock, home markups fall and
foreign markups increase. With these changes in markups, domestic prices are lower than
they would have been under constant markups. Therefore domestic production is higher
8In both cases the steady state markup is 20%.
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than it would have been without variable markups. Endogenous markup variability means
that the initial negative response to home GDP is less negative, and the initial positive
response of foreign GDP is less positive.
Quantitative impact of variable markups
The last section clearly shows the qualitative e¤ects of variable markups. The
inclusion of variable markups in an international real business cycle model should lead
to greater international business cycle correlation. However the quantitative impact can
only be found by simulating the model and calculating business cycle correlations with and
without variable markups.
First we will show how markup variability a¤ects the elasticity of output co-
movement with respect to changes in trade integration. This elasticity is the variable of
interest in Frankel and Rose (1998) and other empirical studies. Then we will show how
markup variability a¤ects cyclical co-movement across the entire range of trade integration,
from autarky to free trade. We also show how the steady state markup, the type of com-
petition (quantity or price), the substitutability of home and foreign goods, and the degree
of market segmentation can a¤ect the importance of markup variability.
The e¤ects of trade on co-movement
In a seminal paper, Frankel and Rose (1998) measure the increase in bilateral
GDP correlation resulting from a change in bilateral trade intensity. This cross-sectional
regression method is common in the empirical literature that measures the e¤ect of trade
on co-movement.9
9See Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Imbs (2004 and 2006), Kose and Yi (2006), and Calderon et al.
(2007).
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T is a measure of bilateral trade intensity and  is a measure of bilateral GDP
correlation. T1 and T2 represent two levels of bilateral trade intensity, assume without loss
of generality that T2 > T1. 1 and 2 are measures of bilateral GDP correlation arising
from the two levels of trade intensity, T1 and T2. The parameter that Frankel and Rose and
others measure using a cross-sectional regression is:
 =
2   1
lnT2   lnT1 (IV.24)
Since trade intensity is usually endogenous, this parameter can be di¢ cult to
measure empirically. However, in a model, the degree of trade intensity can be altered
with the exogenous trade cost parameter c. Thus in a model, a decrease in the trade cost
parameter c causes an increase in trade intensity from T1 to T2. When the model is solved
using a rst order approximation, the theoretical moments 1 and 2 can be calculated.
Kose and Yi (2001 and 2006) measure the parameter  in a simulated real business
cycle model. They show that this parameter is negative under the assumption of complete
international asset markets.
In the previous section we discussed the intuition behind why endogenous markup
variability should lead to greater business cycle co-movement. To quantify this e¤ect, we
can simulate the international real business cycle model with and without variable markups
and calculate the  term in (IV.24).
The parameter  implied by the model is reported in table 10. This table re-
ports the  implied by the model under various situations relating to di¤erent steady state
markups, di¤erent types of competition (price or quantity), di¤erences in the import demand
elasticity (the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods), and di¤erences
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in market segmentation. To calculate , we set T1 equal to the benchmark level of trade
integration, a 25% import share. T2 is the import share under costless trade, 50%. Thus 
measures the e¤ect of doubling the degree of trade intensity.
The benchmark parameterization is listed in the rst two columns of the top row
of table 10. The rst column lists the e¤ect of trade on correlation when markups are
variable, while markups are held constant in the second column.
The  implied by the model under the assumption of constant markups is negative.
When endogenous markup variability is introduced in the model,  becomes positive. Thus
the IRBC model with endogenous markup variability can produce the positive e¤ect of trade
on co-movement.
The rst two columns in table 10 report the results for the benchmark parameter-
ization of the model. The remaining columns in the top row and the rst two columns in
the second row report the models implied  assuming di¤erent values for the steady state
markup. When the markup is only 15%,  is still negative even after introducing variable
markups, but in all cases, introducing markup variability increases . Thus endogenous
markup variability causes trade to have a greater e¤ect on business cycle co-movement.
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Table 10. Elasticity of output co-movement with respect to changes in trade intensity with
and without variable markups
Steady state markup 20% 15%
Competition: Quantity Quantity
Pricing to Market or Not: PTM PTM
Import demand elasticity: 7:5 7:5
Markups, Variable or Constant: Variable Constant Variable Constant
E¤ect of trade on correlation: 0:014  0:036  0:016  0:051
Steady state markup 25% 20%
Competition: Quantity Price
Pricing to Market or Not: PTM PTM
Import demand elasticity: 7:5 7:5
Markups, Variable or Constant: Variable Constant Variable Constant
E¤ect of trade on correlation: 0:040  0:023  0:002  0:048
Steady state markup 20% 20%
Competition: Quantity Quantity
Pricing to Market or Not: PTM PTM
Import demand elasticity: 10 5
Markups, Variable or Constant: Variable Constant Variable Constant
E¤ect of trade on correlation:  0:014  0:071 0:085 0:048
Steady state markup 20%
Competition: Quantity
Pricing to Market or Not: No PTM
Import demand elasticity: 7:5
Markups, Variable or Constant: Variable Constant
E¤ect of trade on correlation: 0:006  0:081
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The remaining entries in table 10 report the  implied by the model with and
without variable markups under di¤erent assumptions about competition, international
goods substitutability, and domestic and export market segmentation (e.g. can rms price
to market or not). The rst two columns in the bottom row report the models prediction of
 assuming that rms are engaged in price competition. The results show that endogenous
market variability still has a sizeable positive impact on  even when rms are engaged in
price competition. Introducing variable markups increases  by about 0:05.
In columns three and four, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods is equal to ten. If we compare these results to those in the benchmark, we see that
introducing markup variability has a greater e¤ect on  when goods are more substitutable
across borders.
In columns ve and six the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods is set to 5. Here we see that trade has a much greater e¤ect on cyclical correlation
when home and foreign goods are less substitutable, for  is positive even when markups are
constant. A comparison of columns ve and six shows that introducing markup variability
still increases  by about 0:04.
Finally, in columns seven and eight we assume rms must set the same price for
both the domestic and export markets (i.e. they cannot price to market). Here we see that
when rms cannot price to market endogenous markup variability has the greatest e¤ect
on . Introducing markup variability increases  by almost 0:09.
Markup variability and cyclical co-movement across the entire range
of trade integration, from autarky to free trade
The cross-country correlation of GDP uctuations as a function of the import share
is presented in gure 9. This gure compares the bilateral correlation under the assumption
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Figure 9. Cross-country GDP correlation as a function of the import share, for variable and
constant markups.
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of variable markups arising from rms engaged in quantity competition to the correlation
assuming a constant markup.
As predicted in an earlier section, cross-country GDP uctuations are more corre-
lated in the model assuming a variable markup than in the model with a constant markup.
Introducing markup variability increases GDP correlation as much as seven percentage
points at high levels of trade integration.
The results in gure 9 are calculated assuming a steady state markup of 20%. Fig-
ure 10 presents the di¤erence between GDP correlation in the model with variable markups
and GDP correlation in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share.
Thus the solid line in gure 10 is the di¤erence between the two lines in gure 9. The gure
presents the results assuming a 15%, 20%, or 25% markup. As the steady state markup in-
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Figure 10. Di¤erence in the cross-country GDP correlation between the model with vari-
able markups and in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share.
Calculated assuming a steady state markup of 15%, 20%, or 25%.
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creases, markup variability has a greater e¤ect on cyclical co-movement. With a 25% steady
state markup, markup variability adds nearly ten percentage points to GDP correlation at
high levels of trade integration.
The results presented thus far assume the import demand elasticity,  = 7:5. As
discussed earlier, empirical studies have found that at a sectoral level of disaggregation,
this elasticity lies between ve and ten. The e¤ect of introducing variable markups and
how it depends on the import demand elasticity is presented in gure 11. This gure
plots the di¤erence between GDP correlation in the model with variable markups and GDP
correlation in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share assuming
that  = 7:5,  = 5 or  = 10. Scale is the only di¤erence between the three lines in the
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Figure 11. Di¤erence in the cross-country GDP correlation between the model with vari-
able markups and in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share.
Calculated assuming di¤erent values for the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods.
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gure. When the import demand elasticity is higher, markup variability has a greater e¤ect
on cyclical correlation.
So far we have assumed that rms are engaged in quantity competition. Figure 12
plots the di¤erence between GDP correlation in the model with variable markups and GDP
correlation in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share assuming
that rms are engaged in price or quantity competition. The gure shows that endogenous
markup variability has less of an e¤ect on cyclical correlation when rms are engaged in
price competition, but the e¤ect is still signicant. At high levels of trade integration,
endogenous markup variability adds ve percentage points to GDP correlation when rms
are engaged in price competition.
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Figure 12. Di¤erence in the cross-country GDP correlation between the model with vari-
able markups and in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share.
Calculated under the assumption of price competition and the assumption of quantity
competition.
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Figure 13. Di¤erence in the cross-country GDP correlation between the model with variable
markups and in the model with constant markups as a function of the import share. Cal-
culated under the assumption that domestic and export markets are segmented and under
the assumption that they are not.
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Finally in gure 13 we relax the assumption that markets are segmented and that
rms can choose separate prices for the domestic and export markets. We can see that
assuming rms cannot price to market actually increases the e¤ect of variable markups, but
otherwise the results of the model do not depend on the assumption of market segmentation.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper introduces endogenous markup variability into the international real
business cycle model. Specically this paper examines how endogenous markup variability
can a¤ect international business cycle co-movement.
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The intuition here is simple. Endogenous markup variations lead to a change
in home and foreign relative prices that is exactly opposite to the change caused by a
country specic productivity shock. Thus a country specic productivity shock should lead
to business cycle divergence in a real business cycle model. When markups are variable,
the same shock leads to less divergence.
The qualitative e¤ect of variable markups on business cycle correlation are clear.
This paper set out to quantify those e¤ects.
We found that the introduction of markup variability into the international real
business cycle model leads to about a ten percentage point increase in business cycle cor-
relation. Furthermore, we found that introducing markup variability can help reconcile the
e¤ect of trade intensity on business cycle correlation found in a model with the e¤ect found
in the data.
This paper ts into the young but growing literature that applies the microeco-
nomic issue of endogenous markup variability to macroeconomic questions. Up to this
point, endogenous markup variability has been mostly used to study macroeconomic issues
related to prices and exchange rates. However this paper shows that the e¤ect of endoge-
nous markup variability on cross-country business cycle correlation is not trivial. The e¤ect
of markup variability on other questions pertaining to quantities and production allocation
is a promising avenue for further research.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX
Technical Appendix to Chapter II
Model Solution
Solution to the Firms Problem
In this model, production technology is complicated, with multiple sectors, mul-
tiple countries, and multiple stages of production. However most of the input and output
demand functions can simply be expressed as the solution to a within period optimization
problem. Only when discussing investment do we have to consider a multi-period solution
to the rms problem. Since the technologies are identical for each of the three countries
(only the parameters are di¤erent) we will only solve the model for one of the two small
countries, country 1.
Within period Optimization Problems - Demand functions and price indices
The solution to the households optimization problem (latter in this appendix) will give
us the demand for the consumption good, C1t. The solution of the rms intertemporal
optimization problem will give us the demand for investment goods, Ii1t for i = n; d. Thus
aggregate output is y1t = C1t +
P
i2n;d
Ii1t. From here we can use the principle of cost mini-
mization by households and rms to nd the demand functions for all intermediate goods
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and primary factors of production in the model. This same analysis will allow us to write
the price of every good in terms of wage rates and rental rates in both countries.
To begin, consider (II.18), the function that described the imperfect combination of
the two nal goods, yi1t for i = n; d, into one aggregate good, y1t. Intratemporal optimization
requires that in equilibrium the marginal contribution to y1t from one more unit of yi1t
divided by the price of yi1t, p
yi
1t, is equal for all i:
@y1t
@yn1t
pyn1t
=
@y1t
@yd1t
pyd1t
We can then rearrange this expression into a demand function for yi1t:
yi1t =

1
2
f 
pyi1t
 f
y1t
The prices pyi1t for i = n; d are in terms of units of the nal consumption good.
Thus we can use the demand functions yi1t in both sectors and in all three countries to
dene the real exchange rates. This exchange rate is simply the price of the nal consump-
tion/investment good in country h, where h = 2; w divided by its corresponding price in
country 1:
rxh1t =
" P
i2n;d
 
1
2
f 
pyiht
1 f# 11 f
" P
i2n;d
 
1
2
f 
pyi1t
1 f# 11 f
The nal goods, yi1t for i = n; d, are composites of domestically produced and
imported nal goods. We can use the aggregator function (II.17) and again the principle of
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cost minimization to derive demand functions for both the domestic and imported varieties
of the nal good from sector i:
yi11t = (!
y
11)
y
 
mcyi1t
pyi1t
! y
yi1t (A.1)
yih1t =
 
!yh1
y  rxh1t mcyiht
pyi1t
! y
yi1t
where h = 2; w, mcyiht is the marginal cost of producing a unit of nal output from sector i
in country h. Here we are using the assumption that rms operate in perfectly competitive
markets, and thus the sale price of a good is equal to its marginal cost. Notice that since
the foreign marginal cost, mcyiht, is in terms of the foreign consumption good, we multiply
it by the real exchange rate to put in it terms of the home consumption good.
The price index describing the price of nal output from sector i, pyi1t, can be
derived by using the demand functions (A.1) and the expenditure shares. The price of nal
output from sector i is given by:
pyi1t =
"
(!y11)
y

mcyi1t
1 y
+
P
h=2;w
 
!yh1
y 
rxh1t mc
yi
ht
1 y# 11 y
After we have derived the demands for yi11t and y
i
h1t for i = n; d, we can use the
resource constraint for the distribution of nal goods to nd the demand for nal goods
production in each sector and each country , Y i1t. Once we know the demand for nal goods
production, we can nd the demand for inputs. We need to turn to (II.15) to derive the
demand for value added and intermediate inputs in the production of Y i1t.
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V Ai1t = 
V I
 
mcvai1t
mcyi1t
! V I
Y i1t
xi1t = (1  )
V I
 
pXi1t
mcyi1t
! V I
Y i1t
where mcvai1t is the marginal cost of the value added component and p
Xi
1t is the price index
of intermediate inputs into production in sector i. Using these demand functions we can
derive an expression for the marginal cost of production for a rm producing the nal good
in sector i in country 1:
mcyi1t =

()
V I  
mcvai1t
1 V I
+ (1  )V I  pXi1t 1 V I 11 V I
Once we know the demand for value added inputs into the production of nal
goods, we can derive the demand for capital and labor inputs into the production of nal
goods. These are derived, just as before, from the value added aggregator function (II.14).
Therefore the demand for capital and labor inputs into nal goods production in sector i
is:
Nyi1t = 
mcvai1t
w1t
V Ai1t
Kyi1t = (1  )
mcvai1t
ri1t
V Ai1t
where MCvai1t is the marginal cost of the value added component to production. We can
write it in the following way:
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mcvai1t =
1
Ai1t

W1t

  Ri1t
1  
1 
Notice that our exogenous productivity parameter, Ai1t, a¤ects the marginal cost
of value added. This is the only place where the exogenous productivity parameter is
involved in either the demand functions or price indices of the model. In the steady state,
industrial specialization is caused by one country having an absolute advantage in one
particular sector. In terms of the model, if we wanted to say that country 1 had an absolute
advantage in sector i then we would say Ai1t > A
i
ht. Since this productivity parameter
factors into the marginal cost of the value added part of the production process, this would
say that the rm in sector i in country 1 can produce the good at a lower unit cost than its
counterpart in country h.1
The demand for capital and labor inputs are important and we will return to those
shortly, but we turn now to the demand for intermediate inputs into production in sector
i, xi1t. Equation (II.13) describes how the quantity of intermediate inputs into sector i,
xi1t, is an imperfect combination of intermediate inputs supplied to sector i from all sectors
k = n; d. We can use this aggregator function to derive the demand for intermediate inputs
into sector i from sector k.
1Saying that the rm in country 1 can produce at a lower unit cost than the rm in country h assumes that
wages rates and shadow prices of capital are equal across countries in the steady state. The two countries
are symmetric, so wages are equal. However if this absolute advantage leads country j to specialize in sector
i then the presence of risk and risk premia will make the shadow price of capital in sector i and country j,
rijt, higher than the shadow price in country h, r
i
ht. This means that di¤erence across countries in unit costs
are not as great as would be implied by the di¤erences in the productivity parameter, but in all but very
extreme cases of risk and risk aversion, the country with the absolute advantage will have the lower unit
costs.
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xii1t = ()
II

pXii1t
pXi1t
 II
xi1t
xki1t = (1  )
II

pXki1t
pXi1t
 II
xi1t where k 6= i
where pki1t is the price index describing the price of intermediate inputs from sector k into
sector i. These price indices can then be combined into the price index of all intermediate
inputs into sector i.
pXi1t =

()
II  
pXii1t
1 II
+ (1  )II

pXki1t
1 II 11 II
The term describing inputs from sector k into sector i, xki1t, is an imperfect com-
bination of domestically produced and imported inputs. Equation (II.12) describes this
imperfect combination. From this function we can derive demand functions for intermedi-
ate inputs produced both at home and in the other two countries:
xki11t = (!
x
11)
x

mcvak1t
pXki1t
 x
xki1t
xkih1t = (!
x
h1)
x

rxh1t mc
vak
ht
pXki1t
 x
xki1t
where h = 2; w, and mcvak1t is the marginal cost of producing a unit of the intermediate
good from sector k. Notice, as before when we derived foreign and domestic demand of nal
goods, that when a good is shipped internationally the real exchange rate, rxh1t , is included
in the price. With these demand functions we can write the price of inputs to sector i from
sector k, pki1t, as a function of the marginal costs,the trade cost, and the real exchange rate.
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pXki1t =
"
(!x11)
x

mcvak1t
1 x
+
P
h=2;w
(!xh1)
x

rxh1t mc
vak
ht
1 x# 11 x
Once we know the demand for the inputs xki11t and x
ki
h1t for k; i = n; d, we can
use the resource constraint for the distribution of intermediate goods to nd the demand
for intermediate goods production in sector i and country 1, Xi1t. Once we know these
production demands we can use the production function in (II.10) to nd the demand for
the inputs into the production of Xi1t. The only inputs into the production of intermediate
goods are capital and labor, thus the demand for capital and labor by intermediate goods
producing rms is:
Nxi1t = 

mcvai1t
w1t

Xi1t
Kxi1t = (1  )

mcvai1t
ri1t

Xi1t
Notice that while the various price indices in the model are complicated functions
involving elasticities of substitution, they are simply functions of the wage rates in both
countries and the rental rates in both sectors and both countries.
The intertemportal solution to the rms problem As discussed in the main body
of the paper, the rm in sector i in country 1 maximizes its stock price by maximizing the
expected discounted value of future dividend payments:
P i1t = Et
1X
=1
Qi1t+d
i
1t+
where:
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di1t = r
i
1tK
i
1t   Ii1t
subject to various output and input demand functions, and the capital accumulation con-
straint:
Kijt+1 = (1  )Kijt + 
 
Iijt
Kijt
!
Kijt
At time t the rm will choose Ii1t and K
i
1t to maximize the following Lagrangian:
L = Et
1X
=1
8>><>>:
Qi1t+
 
ri1t+K
i
1t+   Ii1t+

 i1t+

Kijt+1   (1  )Kijt   

Iijt
Kijt

Kijt

9>>=>>;
The rst order conditions with respect to Ii1t and K
i
1t are:
Qi1t = 
i
1t
0
 
Iijt
Kijt
!
(A.2)
Et
(
i1t+1
 
1   + 
 
Iijt+1
Kijt+1
!
  0
 
Iijt+1
Kijt+1
!
Iijt+1
Kijt+1
!
+Qi1t+1r
i
1t+1
)
= i1t
Solution to the Households Problem
As discussed in the main body of the paper, the household maximizes the expected
discounted value of future utility, which is an increasing function of consumption and a
decreasing function of labor supplied. At the beginning of period 0 the household owns
109
100% of both domestic rms and none of the foreign rms. In period 0 the household sells
shares in the domestic rms and buys shares in the foreign rms in an attempt to diversify
risk and smooth future income uctuations.
In period 0 the household in country 1 will choose C1;0; N1;0; i11; 
i
h1; for i = n; d
and h = 2; w, and C1t; N1t 8 t  1 to maximize the expected discounted value of future
utility subject to their period 0 budget constraint and all future budget constraints. There
is also the constraint that the household cannot take a short position on foreign stocks,
ih1  0. The households problem can be expressed as the following Lagrangian:
L = maxE0
1X
t=0
t

1
1   (C1t)
1    () 
h
h + 1
(N1t)
h+1
h

 1;0
"
C1;0 +
P
i2n;d
i11P i1 +
P
h=2;w
P
i2n;d
ih1P ih   w1;0N1;0  
P
i2n;d
 P i1 + di1;0
#
 E0
1X
t=1
t1t
"
C1t   w1tN1t  
P
i2n;d
i11d
i
1t  
P
h=2;w
P
i2n;d
(1  )ih1rxh1t diht
#
+
P
h=2;w
P
i2n;d
i1
i
h1
The rst order conditions of the households problem with respect to C1;0; N1;0; i11; 
i
h1
and C1t; N1t 8 t  1 are:
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(C1;0)
  = 1;0 (A.3)
 (N1;0)
1
h = w1;01;0
1;0P i1 = E0
1X
t=1
t1td
i
1t
1;0P ih = i1 + E0
1X
t=1
t1t (1  ) rxtdiht
(C1t)
  = 1t
 (N1t)
1
h = w1t1t
Numerical Solution Method
In this model the steady state levels of nancial integration and the steady state
risk premia on capital depend on the variances and covariance of certain real variables.
These variances and covariances are found through a stochastic approximation of the model.
This approximation is only good in the neighborhood of the steady state. Thus the moments
of certain real variables are needed to nd the steady state, which is needed to nd the
moments of certain real variables.
Since these moments are used to nd the optimal portfolio holdings and risk premia
on capital returns, we need to consider three rst order conditions, which are all listed in
the text and the previous section of this appendix. Lets consider the rst order condition
of the domestic households problem with respect to domestic equity shares and the rst
order condition of the foreign households problem with respect to domestic portfolio shares
in equation (A.3), and the rst order condition of the rms problem with respect to next
periods capital stock in equation (A.2). We follow Devereux and Sutherland (2006) and
take a second order approximation of these rst order conditions to nd an expression for
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asset prices and the risk premium on capital returns as a function of steady state values
and second moments of certain real variables. For intuition these were included in the text
in equations (II.31) and (II.33).
The iterative method we use to nd the equilibrium is similar to the method in
Heathcote and Perri (2007). We begin with an initial guess of the variances and covariances
of certain real variables. We use this initial guess to solve for a steady state. We then take
a rst order approximation around this steady state and nd the variances and covariance
of the same real variables that we were forced to guess at initially. We take these new
moments and use them to nd a new steady state around which to take another rst order
approximation. We repeat this process until the moments we used to calculate a steady
state are nearly identical to the moments from the rst order approximation of the model.
In reality the model converges rather quickly, never needing more than a few
iterations.
Details from the empirical estimations
Alternate measures of trade and nancial integration
Since accurate and complete data on bilateral nancial ows does not exist for a
broad set of countries, we are forced to rely on a proxies for bilateral nancial integration.
We use four measures of nancial integration. The rst two are "volume based" measures
nancial integration. These actually measure the volume of nancial ows between two
countries. The last two measures are "e¤ective" measures of nancial integration, which
proxy the degree of nancial integration by looking at the e¤ects of this integration, as seen
through similarities in interest rates or the extent of risk sharing.
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The primary measure is found in equation (II.1) in the text.
The second measure of bilateral nancial integration, F cpisjh , comes the closest
to a true measure of direct nancial ows between countries j and h. This is based on
the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) conducted by the IMF and featured
in Imbs (2006). This measure involves portfolio assets, both debt and equity, issued by
residents of country j and owned by residents of country h, fjh. The proxy of bilateral
nancial integration, F cpisjh , is simply the sum of bilateral asset holdings normalized by the
sum of the two countriesGDPs:
F cpisjh =
fjh + fhj
GDPj +GDPh
(A.4)
The e¤ective measures of nancial integration proxy integration by interest rate
di¤erentials and the degree of risk sharing. The rst e¤ective measure, called Fmadjh , uses
the mean absolute deviation of the real rates of return in country j and h. We calculate
the mean absolute deviation of both stock and bond returns and sum them to get Fmadjh .
Fmadjh =
NP
i=1
1
T
TP
t=1
rijt   rikt (A.5)
where rijt is the real rate of return on nancial asset i in country j in period t. If country
j and country h are integrated nancially, then arbitrage conditions require that their real
rates of return are equal. Thus Fmadjh should be small for nancially integrated economies.
The fourth measure of nancial integration F rsjh measures the extent of income
and consumption risk sharing in countries j and h, F rsjh = j + h, where the risk sharing
measure  is introduced in Asdrubali, Sorensen, and Yosha (1996) and used as a measure
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of nancial integration in Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2003). j is the coe¢ cient
in a regression involving time series of gross domestic product and consumption in country
j, GDPjt and Cjt:
 log (GDPjt)  log (Cjt) = t + j log (GDPjt) + "jt (A.6)
where t are time xed e¤ects, and thus capture the e¤ect of non-diversiable aggregate
production risk.
In the case of no risk sharing, j = 0, uctuations in GDPjt translate directly into
uctuations in Cjt (up to some idiosyncratic error, "jt). In the case of perfect risk sharing,
j = 1, uctuations in GDPjt do not carry through into uctuations in Cjt, and Cjt is a
constant (again, up to some idiosyncratic error, "jt). Integration in international nancial
markets leads to this risk sharing. Thus if F rsjh = j + h is high then countries j and h are
well integrated into the international nancial system. This makes it likely that the degree
of bilateral nancial integration between countries j and h is high.
In addition to the primary measure of trade integration found in (II.2), for ro-
bustness we will also use the measure of bilateral trade intensity from Frankel and Rose
(1998).
T 2jh =
P
i2N
Xijh +M
i
jh
GDPj +GDPh
(A.7)
The estimation results in this paper hold when using our three alternate measures
of nancial integration, our one alternative measure of trade integration, and when we
calculate GDP correlation using our two alternate detrending methods. The details from
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these alternate regressions can be found on the authors website.
Countries in the estimations
Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium-Luxembourg; Brazil; Bulgaria; Canada;
Chile; China; Colombia; Czech Rep.; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; Finland; France; Germany;
Greece; Hong Kong; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kenya;
Korea; Latvia; Malaysia; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan;
Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; South
Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Taiwan; Thailand; Turkey; UK; Uruguay;
USA; Venezuela
Technical Appendix to Chapter III
In this appendix, we discuss the solution to the model. We start with the house-
holds maximization problem, and then derive the various demand functions and price in-
dices. We then discuss the solution to the households wage setting problem and the rms
price setting problem, the two sources of nominal rigidity in the model.
Household Maximization Problem
Each household will maximize the present value of future utility given by (III.6)
subject to their budget constraint in (III.8). The Lagrangian that describes the households
problem is the following:
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L = E
1P
t=0
t
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
h
ln (Ct (j)  bCt 1 (j))   o (hst (j))2
i
 t
266666666664
PtCt(j) + PtIt(j) + PtTt(j)
+Bt(j)  (1 + it 1)Bt 1(j) + Et
 
BFt (j)  (1 + it 1)BFt 1(j)

 Wt (j)hst (j) Rtzt (j)Kt 1 (j)
  R n0 t(j; i)di+ bf2 EtBFt (j)Pt   nfaFss2
377777777775
 t
h
Kt  

1     1+ (zt (j))1+

Kt 1   

It
Kt 1

Kt 1
i
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
(A.8)
The rst order conditions with respect to Ct(j), It (j), Kt (j), zt (j), Bt (j), and
BFt (j) are:
1
Ct (j)  bCt 1 = P tt (A.9)
t
0

It
Kt 1

= P tt
t

= t+1Rt+1zt+1 (j) + t+1

(1   (zt+1)) + 

It+1
Kt

  0

It+1
Kt

It+1
Kt

tRtKt 1 (j) = tzt (j)
 Kt 1 (j)
t+1
t
=
1
(1 + it)
t+1
t
=

1 + bf

BFt (j)
P t
  nfaFss

Et
Et+1 (1 + it )
A combination of the two rst order conditions with respect to bonds yields the
uncovered interest parity condition:
(1 + it )
(1 + it)
=
Et
Et+1

1 + bf

BFt (j)
P t
  nfaFss

(A.10)
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Demand Functions and Price Indices
The demand for private consumption and investment can be derived from the
various rst order conditions. This, along with exogenous government spending gives us
aggregate nal demand, Yt, by (III.12). From there we can derive the demand for both
traded and nontraded goods using the nal good aggregator function in (III.5):
yt = 

MCt
Pt
 
Yt (A.11)
xt = (1  )

P Tt
Pt
 
Yt (A.12)
where MC is the marginal cost of production, P T is an index of the price of traded goods,
and P is the consumer price index:
Pt =
h
 (MCt)
1  + (1  )  P Tt 1 i 11  (A.13)
Use the non-traded goods production function and the demand for non traded
goods, yt, to derive the demand for labor and capital by non-traded goods producing rms:
hyt = (1  )
MCt
Wt (1 + it 1)
yt (A.14)
Kyt = 
MCt
Rt
yt (A.15)
The demand for labor shows that we are adopting the working capital assumption
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from Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Workers must be paid in advance, and
thus the wage rate paid by the rm is Wt (1 + it 1) where Wt is the actual wage paid to
the employee, but since the wage is paid in advance the time value, (1 + it 1), of that wage
must be internalized by the rm. This is simply a way to incorporate that rms must hold
working capital (like inventory, cash, accounts receivable), and thus there is a time value
cost. Given these factor demand functions, the marginal cost of production, MCt, is:
MCt =

Wt (1 + it 1)
1  
1 Rt


(A.16)
If we dene xdt =
 
1
n
 1

R n
0 x
d
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
and xmt =

1
1 n
 1
 R 1
n x
m
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
as aggregate domestically supplied and imported traded goods, then the traded goods ag-
gregator function in (III.3) can be rewritten as:
xt =

n
 1
 1
 1

h
xdt
i  1

+

(1  n)  1 1
 1

[xmt ]
 1

 
 1
Use this aggregator function to derive the demands for domestic and imported
goods:
xdt = (n)
1 
1 

P dt
P Tt
 
xt (A.17)
xmt = (1  n)
1 
1 

Pmt
P Tt
 
xt (A.18)
where P d is a price index for domestic goods, and Pm is an import price index. With
domestic and imported prices, the index for the price of all traded goods is:
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P Tt =

(n)
1 
1 

P dt
1 
+ (1  n) 1 1  (Pmt )1 
 1
1 
(A.19)
The market clearing condition linking one countrys exports with another coun-
trys imports is simply xmt = (1  c)xxt , and this combined with the assumption that
transporting rms earn zero prot, links the export prices in one country with the import
in another:
Pmt =
P xt
(1  c)Et (A.20)
where Et is the nominal exchange rate denoted in units of the foreign currency per units of
the home currency.
Since rms that can price-to-market are indexed i 2 (0; ns] and those that cannot
are indexed i 2 (ns; n], the goods output from rms that can price-to-market can be written
as xadt =
 
1
ns
 1

R ns
0 x
d
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
and the output of the rms that cannot price-to-
market can be written as xbdt =

1
n(1 s)
 1
 R n
ns x
d
t (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
. Therefore the aggregator
of domestically supplied traded goods can be written as:
xdt =

(s)
1


xadt
 1

+ (1  s) 1

xbdt
 1

 
 1
Use this to derive the demands for goods from rms that cannot price-to-market
and those that can:
xadt = s

P adt
P dt
 
xdt (A.21)
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xbdt = (1  s)

P bt
P dt
 
xdt (A.22)
where P ad is the index of prices among domestic goods rms that can price-to-market, and
P b is the price index for rms that cannot. With these price indices, the price index for all
domestic traded goods is:
P dt =

(s)

P adt
1 
+ (1  s)

P bt
1  11 
(A.23)
The demands and price indices in the export market are the same, just all super-
scripts d are replaced with superscripts x.
Use the functions for xadt and x
bd
t to derive the demand functions facing the indi-
vidual rm:
xadt (i) =
1
ns

P adt (i)
P adt
 
xadt (A.24)
xbdt (i) =
1
n (1  s)

P bt (i)
P bt
 
xbdt (A.25)
where P adt (i) and P
b
t (i) is the price set by the individual rm that can and cannot price-
to-market, respectively. P adt and P
b
t are price indices given by:
P adt =

1
ns
R ns
0

P adt (i)
1 
di
 1
1 
(A.26)
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P bt =

1
n (1  s)
R n
ns

P bt (i)
1 
di
 1
1 
(A.27)
Nominal Price Setting
Wage Setting
In any given period, household j faces a probability of 1 w of being able to reset
their wage, otherwise it is reset automatically according to Wt (j) = t 1Wt 1 (j), where
t 1 =
Pt 1
Pt 2 .
If household j is allowed to reset their wages in period t they will set a wage
to maximize the expected present value of consumption from real labor income minus the
disutility of labor.
Et
1P
l=0
l (w)
l
n
t+lt;t+lWt (j)h
s
t+l (j)   
 
hst+l (j)
2o
where t+l is the marginal utility of consumption in period t+ l
t;t+l =
8>><>>:
1 if l = 0
t+l 1t;t+l 1 if l > 0
The imperfect combination of labor from di¤erent households is described in
(III.11). Use this function to derive the demand function for labor from a specic household:
hst (j) =

Wt (j)
Wt
 
hst
121
where Wt =
R n
0 Wt (j)
1  dj
 1
1 
is the average wage rate across households, and hst is
aggregate labor supplied by domestic households.
Substitute the labor demand function into the maximization problem to express
the maximization problem as a function of one choice variable, the wage rate, Wt (j):
Et
1P
l=0
l (w)
l
8<:t+lt;t+lWt (j)

Wt (j)
Wt
 
hst    
 
Wt (j)
Wt
 
hst
!29=;
After some rearranging, the rst order condition of this problem is:
(Wt (j))
+1 =

(   1)2 (Wt)

Et
1P
l=0

l (w)
l

Wt+l
t;t+lWt
2  
hst+l
2
Et
1P
l=0

l (w)
l t+l (t;t+l)

Wt+l
t;t+lWt

hst+l

If wages are exible, and thus w = 0, this expression reduces to:
Wt (j) =

(   1)
2 hst
t
Thus when wages are exible the wage rate is equal to a mark-up, ( 1) , multiplied
by the marginal disutility of labor, 2 hst , divided by the marginal utility of consumption,
t.
Write the wage rate for the household that can reset wages in period t, Wt (j), as
~Wt (j) to denote it as an optimal wage. Also note that all households that can reset wages
in period t will reset to the same wage rate, so ~Wt (j) = ~Wt.
All households face a probability of (1  w) of being able to reset their wages in a
given period, so by the law of large numbers (1  w) of households can reset their wages in
a given period. The wages of the other w will automatically reset by the previous periods
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ination rate.
So substitute ~Wt into the expression for the average wage rateWt =
R n
0 Wt (j)
1  dj
 1
1 
,
to derive an expression for the evolution of the average wage. With this expression it is
clear how the Calvo framework makes wages sticky:
Wt =

w (t 1;tWt 1)
1  + (1  w)

~Wt
1  11 
Price Setting
In the model, traded goods prices are sticky. The output from traded goods rms
is both sold domestically and exported. Therefore the rm sets prices for both the domestic
market and the foreign market.
In period t, the rm will be able to change its price with probability 1  p. If the
rm cannot change prices then domestic prices are indexed by the previous periods domestic
ination rate, and export prices are indexed by the previous periods foreign ination rate.
The rm that can reset prices in period t will choose P dt (i) and P
x
t (i) to maximize
discounted future prots from both the domestic and foreign markets:
max
P dt (i)
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+l
n
t;t+lP
d
t (i)x
d
t+l (i) MCt+lxdt+l (i)
o
+max
Pxt (i)
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+l

t;t+lP
x
t (i)x
x
t+l (i) MCt+lxxt+l (i)
	 MCt+l 
where MCt+l is marginal cost of production in period t+ l:
The only di¤erence between rms that can price-to-market, indexed i 2 [0; ns],
and those that cannot, indexed i 2 (ns; n], is that the rms that can price-to-market choose
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both P dt (i) and P
x
t (i). Firms that cannot price-to-market can only choose P
d
t (i) = P
x
t (i).
First, we will derive the pricing rules for the rms that can price-to-market. The
rule for the rms that cannot are similar, but since there is an extra constraint they are
slightly more complicated.
The domestic and export demand functions facing the rm are given in (A.24).
Substitute these demand functions into the maximization problem to express this problem
as a function of two choice variables, P dt (i) and P
x
t (i):
max
P dt (i)
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+l
8>><>>:
t;t+lP
d
t (i)
1
ns

Padt (i)
Padt
 
xadt
 MCt+l 1ns

Padt (i)
Padt
 
xadt
9>>=>>; (A.28)
+max
Pxt (i)
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+l
8>><>>:
t;t+lP
x
t (i)
1
ns

Pax(i)
Pax
 
xaxt
 MCt+l 1ns

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After some rearranging, the rst order condition with respect to P dt (i) is:
P adt (i) =

   1
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+lMCt+l

t;t+l
Padt+l
 
xadt+l
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+lt;t+l

t;t+l
Padt+l
 
xadt+l
The rst order condition with respect to P xt (i) is the same, just the superscripts
d are replaced with superscripts x and the home ination index variable t;t+l is replaced
with the foreign ination index variable t;t+l.
If prices are exible, and thus p = 0, then this expression for price reduces to:
P adt (i) =

   1MCt
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which says that the rm will set a price equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
Write the price set by the rm that can reset prices in period t as ~P adt (i) to denote
that it is an optimal price. Firms that can reset prices in period t will all reset to the same
level, so ~P adt (i) = ~P
ad
t . Substitute this optimal price into the price index in (A.26) and use
the fact that in any period 1  p rms will reoptimize prices, and the prices of p rms will
be automatically reset using the previous periods ination rate to derive an expression for
the price index, P adt :
P adt =

p

t 1;tP adt 1
1 
+
 
1  p
 
~P adt
1  11 
As before, the expression for export prices, P axt , is nearly identical, all ds are
replaced with xs, and instead of automatically indexing by the home ination rate, t 1;t,
prices are indexed by the foreign ination rate, t 1;t.
If we impose the constraint that P dt (i) = P
x
t (i), then we can use the same steps to
derive the optimal price for rms that cannot price-to-market. The the rst order condition
of (A.28) with respect to P bt (i) = P
d
t (i) = P
x
t (i) is:
P bt (i) =

   1
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+lMCt+l
(
t;t+l
P bt+l
 
xbdt+l +

t;t+l
P bt+l
 
xbxt+l
)
Et
1P
l=0
l
 
p
l
t+l
(
t;t+l

t;t+l
P bt+l
 
xbdt+l +

t;t+l

t;t+l
P bt+l
 
xbxt+l
)
This expression is slightly more complicated than the earlier price setting equa-
tions, but when prices are exible, p = 0, it reduces to the familiar rule that price is a
constant mark-up over marginal cost.
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Technical Appendix to Chapter IV
The households maximization problem
The household will maximize the expected present value of lifetime utility, (IV.8),
subject to their budget constraint in (IV.9), and capital accumulation equation, (IV.10).
Under complete international nancial markets, the home and foreign households
problems are solved as one maximization problem subject to one worldwide budget con-
straint and two capital accumulation equations:
L = E0
1P
t=o
t
266666666666666666664
1
1 
h
(1 Nt) (Ct)1 
i1 
+ 11 
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(1 Nt ) (Ct )1 
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 t
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Ct + It + qt (C

t + I

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R 1
0
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0
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jt (i) dj

1CCCCCCCA
 t (Kt+1   (1  )Kt   It)
 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
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The rst order conditions with respect to Ct; Ct ; Nt; Nt ; It; It ;Kt+1 and Kt+1 are:
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t = (1  )
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(1 Nt) (Ct)1 
i1 
(Ct)
  (A.29)
tqt = (1  )
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i1 
(1 Nt) 1
tw

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t = 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= (1  ) t+1 + t+1rt+1
t

= (1  ) t+1 + t+1rt+1qt+1
The rms maximization problem
Firm i in sector j will choose a prices and quantities to maximize prot given by:
jt (i) = p
j
D;t (i) y
j
D;t (i) + p
j
X;t (i) y
j
X;t (i)  wtN jt (i)  rtKjt (i) (A.30)
This prot can be rewritten as:
jt (i) =

pjD;t (i) MCt

yjD;t (i) +

pjX;t (i) MCt

yjX;t (i) MCt (A.31)
where MCt = 1At

wt
1 
1   
rt

.
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Quantity Competition
The rm engaged in quantity competition will choose quantities yjD;t (i) and y
j
X;t (i)
to maximize (IV.13) subject to the inverse demand functions in (IV.14). After substituting
the inverse demand function into the prot maximization problem, the rms univariate
maximization problem to choose yjD;t (i) is:
yjD;t (i) = argmax
yjD;t(i)
8<:
0@ N yjD;t (i)
yjD;t
! 1

 
2
yjD;t
yjt
! 1

 
yjt
yt
! 1

 MCt
1A yjD;t (i)
9=; (A.32)
The individual rms choice of yjD;t (i) can inuence total production within sector
j, yjD;t and y
j
t , but not aggregate production yt or marginal cost, MCt. Using the fact
that
d ln yjD;t
d ln yjD;t(i)
= sjt =
1
N and
d ln yjt
d ln yjD;t(i)
= (1 mt) 1N the rst order condition of the rms
problem is:
 
N
yjD;t (i)
yjD;t
! 1

 
2
yjD;t
yjt
! 1

 
yjt
yt
! 1

=
(MCt)
1  1
 
1  1N
  1N 1mt + 1 (1 mt) (A.33)
If this rst order condition is substituted into the inverse demand function in
(IV.14), then the price set by the rm engaging in quantity competition is:
pD;t (i) =
1
1  1
 
1  1N
  1N 1mt + 1 (1 mt)MCt (A.34)
Thus the domestic elasticity of demand for the rm engaged in quantity competi-
tion is:
"d =

1


1  1
N

+
1
N

1

mt +
1

(1 mt)
 1
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If the rm cannot price-to-market, there is one additional constraint that pjD;t (i) =
pjX;t (i) = p
j
t (i). Therefore after substituting the inverse demand functions in (IV.14) into
the rms maximization problems in (IV.13), the rms univariate maximization problem
to choose yjD;t (i) is:
yjD;t (i) = argmax
yjD;t(i)
240@ N yjD;t (i)
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2
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 MCt
1AyjD;t (i) + yjX;t (i)
35
(A.35)
Using the fact that
d ln yjD;t
d ln yjD;t(i)
= sjt =
1
N and
d ln yjt
d ln yjD;t(i)
= (1 mt) 1N , the rst order
condition of the rms problem is:
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(A.36)
= MCt

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d ln yjX;t(i)
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1
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
The condition that pjD;t (i) = p
j
X;t (i) implies that:
yjX;t (i) =
0@ qt
1  c
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(A.37)
which implies:
d ln yjX;t (i)
d ln yjD;t (i)
=
 
1

   1   1 1N   1   1 1N (1 m) 
1

   1   1 1N   1   1 1Nm (A.38)
Thus the rst order condition in (A.36) simplies to:
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pjt (i) =
"
"  1MCt
where
" =

1


1  1
N

+
1
N

1

mt +
1

(1 mt)
 1
sD;t
+

1


1  1
N

+
1
N

1

(1 mt ) +
1

mt
 1
sX;t
and sD;t =
yjD;t(i)
yjD;t(i)+y
j
X;t(i)
and sX;t = 1  sD;t.
Notice that this elasticity of demand is simply a convex combination of the do-
mestic elasticity and the export elasticity.
Price Competition
The rm engaged in price competition will choose prices pjD;t (i) and p
j
X;t (i) to
maximize:
pjD;t (i) = argmax
pjD;t(i)
n
pjD;t (i) MCt

yjD;t (i)
o
(A.39)
pjX;t (i) = argmax
pjX;t(i)
n
pjX;t (i) MCt

yjX;t (i)
o
subject to the following demand functions:
yjD;t (i) =
1
N
 
pjD;t (i)
pjD;t
!   
pjD;t
pjt
!  
pjt
 
yt (A.40)
yjX;t (i) =
1
N
 
pjX;t (i)
pjX;t
! 
1
(1  c)
 
pjM;t
pjt
!  
pjt
 
yt
After substituting the demand function into the maximization problem, the rms
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univariate maximization problem to choose its domestic price, pjD;t (i), is:
pjD;t (i) = argmax
pjD;t(i)
8<:pjD;t (i) MCt 1N
 
pjD;t (i)
pjD;t
!   
pjD;t
pjt
!  
pjt
 
yt
9=; (A.41)
The individual rms choice of pjD;t (i) can inuence sectoral prices, p
j
D;t and p
j
t , but
not aggregate production yt or marginal cost, MCt. Using the fact that
d ln pjD;t
d ln pjD;t(i)
= sjt =
1
N
and d ln p
j
t
d ln pjD;t(i)
= (1 mt) 1N the rst order condition of the rms problem is:
pjD;t (i) =

 
1  1N

+ 1N (mt +  (1 mt))

 
1  1N

+ 1N (mt +  (1 mt))  1
MCt (A.42)
Thus the domestic elasticity of demand for the rm engaged in price competition
is:
"d = 

1  1
N

+
1
N
(mt +  (1 mt))
If the rm cannot price-to-market, there is one additional constraint that pjD;t (i) =
pjX;t (i) = p
j
t (i). Therefore after substituting the demand functions in (A.40) into the rms
maximization problems in (A.39), the rms univariate maximization problem to choose
pjt (i) is:
pjt (i) = argmax
pjt (i)
8>>><>>>:
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
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9>>>=>>>; (A.43)
Using the fact that d ln p
j
D
d ln pj(i)
=
d ln pjX
d ln pj(i)
= sji =
1
N ,
d ln pjt
d ln pjt (i)
= 1N
 
1 mj, and
d ln pjt
d ln pjt (i)
= 1Nm
j, the rst order condition of the rms problem is:
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pjb;t (i) =
"
"  1MCt (A.44)
where " = 
 
1  1N

+ 1N
 
sD;t
 
mj + 
 
1 mj+ sX;t    1 mj+ mj is the elas-
ticity of demand and sD;t =
yjD;t(i)
yjD;t(i)+y
j
X;t(i)
and sX;t = 1  sD;t.
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